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We develop a model with partial insurance against idiosyncratic
wage shocks to quantify risk sharing. Closed-form solutions are
obtained for equilibrium allocations and for moments of the joint
distribution of consumption, hours, and wages. We prove iden-
tification and demonstrate how labor supply data are informative
about risk sharing. The model, estimated with US data over the
period 1967-2006, implies that (i) 39 percent of permanent wage
shocks pass through to consumption; (ii) the share of wage risk
insured increased until the early 1980s; and (iii) preference het-
erogeneity is important in accounting for observed dispersion in
consumption and hours.
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The purpose of this paper is to measure the degree of risk sharing achieved by
US households. Quantifying existing risk sharing is a prerequisite for evaluating
the welfare consequences of adjusting social insurance programs, or changing the
progressivity of the tax system.
One approach to studying risk sharing is to build a structural equilibriummodel,
and to use it as an artificial laboratory to study the response of consumption to
individual income fluctuations. A prominent example is the standard incomplete-
markets model, where households self-insure against income fluctuations by bor-
rowing and lending via a risk-free bond.
However, households can smooth shocks and share risk in many other ways,
including flexible labor supply, progressive taxation, social insurance programs,
within-family transfers, informal networks, and default or bankruptcy (see Heath-
cote, Storesletten, and Violante 2009 for a survey). A problem with the structural
approach is that the total amount of risk sharing achieved in equilibrium will be
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sensitive to the details of which risk-sharing mechanisms are introduced and how
they are modeled, casting doubt on whether any particular formulation comes
close to replicating the amount of risk sharing households can achieve in practice
(see, for example, Kaplan and Violante 2010). Thus, Angus Deaton (1997) has
argued that a more fruitful approach is to try to quantify directly the overall
degree of risk sharing in the economy while remaining agnostic about the exact
details on how households achieve this outcome.1 One influential recent exam-
ple of this less structural approach is Richard Blundell, Luigi Pistaferri and Ian
Preston (2008), who estimate the degree to which permanent changes in earnings
transmit to consumption in the United States.
In this paper, we take a fully structural approach to measuring risk sharing
that is nonetheless designed to address the Deaton critique. We start with a stan-
dard incomplete-markets model and explicitly introduce two important smoothing
mechanisms against idiosyncratic wage fluctuations: elastic labor supply and pro-
gressive taxation. The model also allows for insurance against a subset of wage
fluctuations, as a flexible way to capture the presence of additional risk-sharing
mechanisms. Inspired by Deaton, our focus will be on letting the data identify
the extent of this residual insurance, rather than on specifying the details of how
it is achieved.
The key advantage of retaining a structural approach is that it allows us to
integrate evidence on risk sharing from data on hours worked and consumption
in a theoretically consistent way. Most of the risk-sharing literature to date has
focused on exploring comovement between household income and consumption
(see, e.g., Jappelli and Pistaferri 2010), but data on individual labor supply turn
out to be very informative about insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. The logic
is simply that individuals should adjust hours worked more strongly in response to
insurable versus uninsurable wage fluctuations, reflecting the absence of offsetting
wealth effects in the former case.
Relative to the existing theoretical literature, the key innovation is that the
framework developed here allows for two different types of shocks to individual
hourly wages that are distinguished by their degree of insurability. As in stan-
dard incomplete-markets models, no explicit insurance exists for the first type:
these “uninsurable” shocks can only be smoothed via adjustments to own hours
worked, via borrowing and lending in a riskless bond, or via government redis-
tribution through progressive taxation. In contrast, the second type of shock
can be fully insured, as in complete markets models. One motivation for this
1Deaton (1997, pp. 372-374) writes: “Saving is only one of the ways people can protect their consump-
tion against fluctuations in their incomes. An alternative is to rely on other people, to share risk with
friends and kin, with neighbors, or with anonymous other participants through private or government
insurance schemes, or through participation in financial markets ... [T]he very multiplicity of existing
mechanisms makes it likely that there is at least partial insurance through financial or social institu-
tions, and that such risk sharing adds to the possibilities for autarkic consumption smoothing through
intertemporal transfers of money or goods ... Although it is also possible to examine the mechanisms,
the insurance contracts, tithes, and transfers, their multiplicity makes it attractive to look directly at
the magnitude that is supposed to be smoothed, namely consumption.”
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“insurable” component is that in reality some changes in individual wages are
perfectly forecastable by agents and hence easily smoothed. In addition, there
are certain shocks that can be insured within the family or for which existing in-
stitutions provide explicit insurance, such as unemployment or disability shocks.
Since some but not all shocks are explicitly insurable, this is an economy with
partial insurance.
In the equilibrium of the model, agents choose to not use the bond to smooth
the uninsurable shock. This result extends the logic in George M. Constantinides
and Darrell Duffie (1996) to a much richer environment. Thanks to this result,
and in sharp contrast to the standard incomplete-markets model, equilibrium
allocations of consumption and hours worked can be expressed in closed form, as
log-linear functions of the two idiosyncratic wage components and an idiosyncratic
preference shifter (we allow for heterogeneity in the relative tastes for consumption
versus work).
These closed-form log-linear allocations make it possible to compute and in-
terpret cross-sectional variances and covariances of the joint equilibrium distribu-
tion of wages, hours, and consumption. We use information contained in both the
“macro facts” on the distributions of these variables in levels that have motivated
recent macroeconomic investigations (e.g., Attanasio and Davis 1996; Krueger and
Perri 2006; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante 2010b) and the “micro facts”
on the distributions in growth rates that have been the primary focus of labor
economists (e.g., Abowd and Card 1989; Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2008).
The analytical expressions for these cross-sectional moments allow us to formally
prove identification of all the model’s parameters – something that is usually
impossible in large scale structural models – under mild data requirements that
are satisfied in standard micro data sets. In fact, we prove that the model is
fully identified given only panel data on wages and hours worked (i.e., without
any consumption data). In light of the recent studies questioning the quality
of self-reported consumption expenditures in the United States (e.g., Attanasio,
Battistin, and Ichimura 2007; Aguiar and Bils 2011), it is valuable to be able to
assess whether estimates of risk sharing derived from wage and hours data alone
are consistent with those that also use consumption moments.
Our baseline estimation uses data on wages and hours from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) over the period 1967-2006 and consumption data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) over the period 1980-2006. The
estimated model replicates well the evolution of the empirical cross-sectional dis-
tribution over wages, hours worked, and consumption, both over time and over
the life cycle.
We use the model to derive quantitative answers to three central questions
concerning risk sharing in the US economy: (1) how effectively can households
smooth idiosyncratic wage fluctuations? (2) how has the extent of risk sharing
changed over the last four decades, a period of sharply rising wage inequality? and
(3) what is the role of life-cycle shocks and initial heterogeneity in determining
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cross-sectional dispersion in economic outcomes?
First, we ask how much individual wage risk can be smoothed, and what are
the relative contributions of explicit insurance, labor supply adjustments, and
progressive taxation to consumption smoothing. Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston
(2008) argue that a natural way to quantify consumption smoothing is to measure
how much of a typical permanent income shock passes through to consumption.
Our model suggests that this pass-through coefficient from individual wages to
household consumption is around 40 percent, or equivalently that 60 percent of
permanent wage fluctuations are effectively smoothed. Where does this smoothing
come from? Half of it stems from directly insurable shocks, one-third reflects
progressive taxation, and the rest reflects adjustments to labor supply.
An alternative metric for consumption smoothing, common in the literature, is
the ratio of the within-cohort change in the variance of log consumption to the
corresponding change in the variance of log income (e.g., Blundell and Preston
1998; Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2004a). We demonstrate that these two
measures of pass-through coincide only when earnings taxation is proportional
and labor supply is absent as a smoothing channel for uninsurable shocks (e.g.,
zero Frisch elasticity or balanced growth preferences). Our model also indicates
that, for plausible parameter estimates, the ratio-of-variances statistic is always
smaller than the pass-through coefficient.
Second, we ask how risk sharing has changed over time. We find that US
households were effectively able to insure two-thirds of the sharp increase in wage
inequality over the past 40 years. In 1967 the insurable component of wages
accounted for around 25 percent of the cross-sectional variance of log wages,
whereas by the early 1980s this fraction had risen to around 45 percent. Since
then, the variances of the insurable and uninsurable components of wages have
risen at a similar rate, leaving the fraction of wage fluctuations insured relatively
stable. Data on hours worked are an essential input for these estimates, since no
consumption data are available prior to 1980, and it is the observed increase in
the covariance between wages and hours that indicates an increase in the degree
of risk sharing. Reassuringly, after 1980, we obtain very similar estimates for the
relative importance of insurable and uninsurable shocks regardless of whether we
use all available data, including consumption, or just data on earnings and hours
worked.
Third, we use the estimated model to decompose inequality in the cross section
into components reflecting life-cycle shocks versus initial heterogeneity in produc-
tivity and the disutility of work effort. This decomposition is unique and additive
in our framework. Roughly half of the total cross-sectional variance in earnings
reflects life-cycle shocks to productivity. In contrast, these shocks account for less
than 20 percent of the cross-sectional variances of consumption and hours worked.
Net of measurement error, the most important source of dispersion in consump-
tion is initial heterogeneity in productivity. For hours worked, in contrast, it is
initial heterogeneity in preferences.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops our framework,
derives the equilibrium allocations, and explains how we obtain tractability. In
Section II, we derive closed-form expressions for the equilibrium cross-sectional
moments. Section III proves how these moments allow us to identify all the struc-
tural parameters of the model and describes the data and estimation algorithm.
Section IV lays out the results of the quantitative analysis. Section V concludes.
I. Model economy
We first describe the model formally. Next, we discuss the key assumptions in
detail.
Demographics We adopt the Yaari perpetual youth model: agents are born
at age zero and survive from age a to age a+ 1 with constant probability δ < 1.
A new generation with mass (1− δ) enters the economy at each date t. Thus, the
measure of agents of age a is (1− δ)δa, and the total population size is unity.
Preferences Lifetime utility for an agent born (i.e., entering the labor market)
in cohort birth year b is given by
(1) Eb
∞∑
t=b
(βδ)t−b u (ct, ht;ϕ) ,
where the expectation is taken over sequences of shocks defined below. Here ct
denotes consumption at date t for an agent of age a = t − b, while ht is the
corresponding value for hours worked. Agents discount the future at rate βδ,
where β < 1 is the pure discount factor. Period utility is
(2) u (ct, ht;ϕ) =
c1−γt − 1
1− γ
− exp (ϕ)
h1+σt
1 + σ
.
The parameter γ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption, and σ governs the elasticity of labor supply.2 The preference weight
ϕ captures the strength of an individual’s aversion to work.3 The distribution of
ϕ for the cohort with birth year t is denoted Fϕt, with cohort-specific variance vϕt.
We incorporate preference heterogeneity because, as we will show, it is important
for explaining the observed cross-sectional joint distribution over wages, hours,
and consumption.4 In Section I.C we discuss how our results extend to alternative
2The parameter γ is also related to risk aversion. In particular, the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is 1/(1/γ +1/σ) (see Swanson 2012). As we explain below, the most important role of γ in our model is
that it determines the relative strength of income and substitution effects on hours worked.
3Note that preferences are defined over total hours per period, and model agents are implicitly
indifferent between alternative ways to allocate hours within a period. Thus, the model cannot address
the question of how total annual hours should be divided between hours worked per day (e.g., overtime),
days worked per week (part-time work), and weeks worked by year (nonemployment).
4It has long been recognized that a sizeable fraction of cross-sectional dispersion in hours worked is
unrelated to dispersion in wages (e.g., Abowd and Card 1989).
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preference specifications.
Idiosyncratic risk The population in the economy is partitioned into groups
that we will refer to as “islands,” where each island contains a continuum of
individual agents. Agents face labor productivity shocks at the individual level,
which are uncorrelated across members of each island, and shocks at the island
level, which are common to all members of a given island, but uncorrelated across
islands. Individual labor productivity w is given (in logs) by the sum of the island-
level component, denoted α, and the (orthogonal) individual-level component,
denoted ε:
logwt = αt + εt.
The market structure outlined below will assume differential trading opportuni-
ties between versus within islands, translating into differential insurance against
shocks to α versus ε.
The island-level component α follows a random walk:
αt = αt−1 + ωt,
where the innovation ω is drawn from the distribution Fωt with variance vωt at
time t. The individual-level component ε is itself the sum of two orthogonal
random variables:
εt = κt + θt.
Here θ is a transitory (independently distributed over time) shock drawn from
Fθt with variance vθt, while κ is a permanent component that follows a second
unit root process:
κt = κt−1 + ηt,
where the innovation η is drawn from the distribution Fηt with variance vηt.
5
Agents who enter the labor market at age a = 0 in year t draw initial realizations
α0 and κ0 from distributions Fα0t and Fκ0t, with cohort-specific variances vα0t
and vκ0t. The initial draws ϕ, α
0, and κ0 are assumed to be uncorrelated.6
A law of large numbers (e.g., Uhlig 1996) can be applied twice so that individual-
level ε shocks wash out within an island, and island-level α shocks induce no
aggregate uncertainty in the economy as a whole (see Attanasio and Rı´os-Rull
2000 for a similar structure).
Production Production of the final consumption good takes place through a
5The assumed statistical process for individual efficiency units – unit root plus independently dis-
tributed shocks – has a long tradition in the literature that estimates statistical models for individual
wage dynamics (see, e.g., MaCurdy 1982). The empirical autocovariance function for individual wages
displays a sharp decline at the first lag, indicating the presence of a transitory component in wages. At
the same time, within-cohort wage dispersion increases approximately linearly with age, suggesting the
presence of permanent shocks.
6The initial draws (ϕ, α0) could in principle be correlated if, for example, wages at labor market entry
are a function of schooling, and schooling depends on the preference weight, ϕ. In a previous version of
this paper, we allowed for correlation between α0 and ϕ. The model was still tractable, but the estimated
correlation coefficient was insignificantly different from zero.
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constant returns to scale technology with labor as the only input. The economy-
wide good and labor markets are frictionless and perfectly competitive. Hence,
individual wages equal individual productivities (units of effective labor per hour
worked).
Taxes and redistribution The government operates a progressive tax system.
Following Roland Benabou (2002), an individual with a gross labor income yt =
wtht receives after-tax earnings y˜t given by
(3) y˜t = λ (yt)
1−τ .
The fiscal parameters λ and τ are assumed constant over time. Loosely speak-
ing, λ defines the level of taxation, while τ ≥ 0 defines the rate of progressivity
built into the tax system. To see this, note that log(y˜t) = log(λ)+ (1− τ) log(yt),
and thus (1 − τ) defines the elasticity of after-tax earnings to pretax earnings.
For τ = 0 the system implies a flat tax 1 − λ on labor income, while for τ > 0
the tax system is progressive. The government uses aggregate net tax revenue to
finance a nonvalued public consumption good Gt, which adjusts to balance the
government budget on a period-by-period basis. While this model of taxation is
simple, it is sufficiently flexible to offer a reasonable approximation to the actual
US tax system (see Section III.C).
Market structure All assets in the economy are in zero net supply, and
asset markets are competitive. At birth, each agent is endowed with zero fi-
nancial wealth.7 Individuals born in year b draw values for α0 and ϕ before
any markets open. They are then allocated to an island, which is defined by
an ex ante unknown sequence {ωt}
∞
t=b+1 that will apply to all island members.
Within each island, agents trade a complete set of insurance contracts. In par-
ticular, in every period t ≥ b, agents can purchase contracts indexed to their
st+1 = (ωt+1, ηt+1, θt+1).
8 Scope for insurance across islands is more limited:
agents can only trade insurance contracts indexed to their individual-level shocks
(ηt+1, θt+1), but inter-island contracts contingent on the realization of the island-
level shock ωt+1 are ruled out.
Insurance contracts incorporate mortality risk: if an agent purchases one unit
of insurance against any state st+1, the contract pays δ
−1 units of consumption if
the agent survives to the next period and st+1 is realized, and 0 units otherwise.
Note that agents can effectively trade risk-free bonds freely within or across
islands. In particular, purchasing δ units of insurance for every possible realization
of the pair (ηt+1, θt+1) delivers one unit of consumption risk-free in the next
period.
Information Agents are assumed to take as given the sequences of distributions
7It is straightforward to relax the assumption of zero initial individual financial wealth. The key
requirement, as will become clear below, is that average initial wealth on each island is zero.
8New labor market entrants at date b can also purchase contracts indexed to their (κ0, θb).
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{Fϕt, Fα0t, Fκ0t, Fωt, Fηt, Fθt}
∞
t=0. Thus they have perfect foresight over future
wage distributions.9
A. Agent’s problem
Let st = {sb, sb+1, ..., st} denote the individual history of the shocks for an agent
from birth year b up to date t, where
sj =
{
(b, ϕ, α0, κ0, θb) ∈ Sb = N× R
4 for j = b
(ωj , ηj , θj) ∈ S = R
3 for j > b
with st ∈ Sb × S
t−b.
Let Qt(S; s
t) denote the price of insurance claims purchased at date t from
local (within-island) insurers by an agent with history st that deliver one unit
of consumption at t + 1 if and only st+1 ∈ S ⊆ S. Let Bt(st+1; s
t) denote the
quantity of the claim purchased that pays in individual state st+1. Recall that
insurers can also offer contracts indexed to (ηt+1, θt+1) to agents in other islands.
Define zt+1 ≡ (ηt+1, θt+1) where zt+1 ∈ Z ⊆ R
2. Let Q∗t (Z; s
t) denote the price
of insurance claims purchased at date t from outside (between-island) insurers
by an agent with history st that deliver one unit of consumption at t+ 1 if and
only zt+1 ∈ Z. Let B
∗
t (zt+1; s
t) denote the quantity of the claim purchased from
outside insurers that pays upon the realization zt+1. The agent’s budget constraint
is given by
λ
[
wt(s
t)ht(s
t)
]1−τ
+ dt(s
t) = ct(s
t) +
∫
Qt(st+1; s
t)Bt(st+1; s
t) dst+1(4)
+
∫
Q∗t (zt+1; s
t)B∗t (zt+1; s
t) dzt+1,
where realized wealth at node st =
(
st−1, st
)
is given by
dt(s
t) = δ−1
[
Bt−1(st; s
t−1) +B∗t−1(zt; s
t−1)
]
.
The problem for an agent entering the labor market at date b is to maximize (1)
subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form (4), and the wage process.
In addition, agents face limits on borrowing that rule out Ponzi schemes, and
non-negativity constraints on consumption and hours worked.
B. Competitive equilibrium
Given sequences {Fϕt, Fα0t, Fκ0t;Fωt, Fηt, Fθt}
∞
t=0, a competitive equilibrium is
a set of allocations
{
ct(s
t), ht(s
t), dt(s
t), Bt(·; s
t), B∗t (·; s
t)
}∞
t=0
and prices
9Alternatively, one could assume that the variances of these distributions themselves follow some
stochastic process. The expression for the equilibrium interest rate would be affected, but equilibrium
allocations would remain identical to those described below.
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Qt(S; s
t), Q∗t (Z; s
t)
}∞
t=0
for all dates t, all histories st ∈ Sb×S
t−b, and all S ⊆ S,
Z ⊆ R2 such that (i) allocations maximize expected lifetime utility, (ii) insurance
markets clear, and (iii) the economy-wide markets for the final good and labor
services clear.
PROPOSITION 1: [competitive equilibrium] There exists a competitive equi-
librium characterized as follows:
(i) There is no insurance trade between islands: B∗t (Z; s
t) = 0 for all st and Z.
(ii) Consumption and hours are given by
log ct(s
t) = − (1− τ) ϕ̂+ (1− τ)
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)
αt + C˜
a
t(5)
log ht(s
t) = −ϕ̂+
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
αt +
1
σ̂
εt + H˜
a
t ,(6)
where a = t − b is the age of the individual, C˜at and H˜
a
t are age and
date-specific constants (see Appendix A), 1/σ̂ ≡ (1− τ) / (σ + τ) is a tax-
modified Frisch elasticity, and ϕ̂ ≡ ϕ/ (σ + γ + τ(1− γ)) is a rescaled pref-
erence weight.
(iii) The prices of insurance claims are given by
(7)
Qt(S; s
t) = Qt(S) = β exp
(
−γ∆C˜t+1
) ∫
S
exp
(
−γ(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
ωt+1
)
dFs,t+1
Q∗t (Z; s
t) = Q∗t (Z) = Pr ((ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z)×Qt(S),
where Fst is the joint distribution over (ω, η, θ) at date t, Qt(S) is the price
of a risk-free bond, and ∆C˜t+1 ≡ C˜
a+1
t+1 − C˜
a
t is independent of age.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 says that there is an equilibrium in which all trade takes
place within islands. This result implies zero insurance against the αt component
of idiosyncratic wage risk, because shocks to αt are common to all members of
an island. In particular, there is no self-insurance, via noncontingent borrowing
and lending, against these shocks. In contrast, there is perfect insurance, by
assumption, against shocks to εt. Thus, in this equilibrium, there is a sharp
dichotomy between one type of risk which is uninsured, and another that is fully
insured. In what follows, we will use the label “uninsurable” to denote the ω
shock and the initial draws α0 and ϕ, and the label “insurable” to denote the
(η, θ) shocks and the initial draw κ0. When the variance of insurable shocks
is zero, equilibrium allocations correspond to autarky. When the variance of
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uninsurable shocks is zero, there is complete insurance against idiosyncratic risk.
In the general case, when both types of shocks have positive variance, insurance
is partial.
Part (ii) characterizes equilibrium allocations for consumption and hours worked
in closed form. These expressions indicate that the vector of cumulated values
for the shocks (αt, εt) together with ϕ and age a contain sufficient information to
fully describe an individual’s equilibrium choices at node st. The power of this
result lies in the fact that these are all exogenous states. Crucially, individual
wealth is a redundant state variable, in the sense that it is also only a function of
(a, ϕ, αt, εt). The expression for wealth dt is in Appendix A. Note that no distri-
butional assumptions for wage shocks or preference heterogeneity are required to
deliver these functional forms for equilibrium allocations.10
Part (iii) describes the insurance prices supporting this equilibrium. The key
result is that the prices of insurance contracts on the inter-island market are
actuarially fair, in the sense that they are equal to event-specific probabilities
times the risk-free bond price Qt(S) – the price at which all agents are indifferent
between borrowing and lending on the margin. At these prices, agents have
no incentive to buy insurance from or sell insurance to agents on other islands,
thereby supporting the no-trade result in part (i).
The logic of the proof for Proposition 1 is as follows. We first guess that all
insurance claims are traded within island and that there is no insurance trade
between islands. Hence aggregate island-level net savings is zero on each island.
Because insurance markets are complete within an island, we can solve for the
island-specific allocations via a simple static equal-weight planner’s problem.11
We can use planner problems to solve for within-island allocations, notwithstand-
ing the presence of progressive distortionary taxation at the economy-wide level,
because each island planner controls a measure zero of aggregate resources and
therefore takes the tax function as exogenous. With expressions for consumption
and hours worked in hand, we use the agent’s intertemporal first-order condition
to compute the implied (potentially island-specific) insurance prices. Finally, we
verify that agents on every island assign the same value to any insurance contract
that can be traded, and thus that there are no gains from inter-island trade.
Interpreting equilibrium allocations The impact of the preference parame-
ter ϕ on hours and consumption is readily interpreted: a stronger relative distaste
for work (higher ϕ) reduces labor supply, which transmits to earnings and con-
sumption.
10The distributions only affect the separable constants C˜at and H˜
a
t . We implicitly assume that the
distributions imply finite values for these constants. The absence of an explicit solution for C˜at and H˜
a
t is
no obstacle for the empirical analysis, since the constants can be modeled through age and time dummies
in individual consumption and hours observations.
11Within-island allocations can be determined using equal-weight island-level planning problems be-
cause we defined an island as a group of agents with the same birth date b, common initial conditions(
ϕ,α0
)
, and a common sequence {ωs}
∞
s=b+1.
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Hours worked are increasing in the insurable component εt = κt + θt, and the
response of hours to shocks to εt is defined by the tax-modified Frisch elasticity,
1/σ̂ ≡ (1− τ) / (σ + τ). Progressive taxation (τ > 0) lowers the tax-modified
Frisch elasticity because it reduces the return to increasing hours worked in re-
sponse to a rise in pretax wages. While full insurance with respect to εt rules out
any income effect on hours worked, uninsurable permanent shocks to αt do have
an income effect which is regulated by γ. If γ > 1, the income effect dominates
the substitution effect, and hours worked decline in response to an increase in αt.
If γ < 1, the substitution effect dominates and hours increase.
Individual consumption is independent of εt, since these shocks are fully insured
and utility is separable between consumption and hours. The response of con-
sumption to uninsurable wage shocks depends on the response of hours worked
and the progressivity of taxation. Stronger income effects (larger γ) reduce the
pass-through from wage shocks to consumption, as does more progressive taxation
(larger τ). Note that the expression for individual consumption is not what the
permanent income hypothesis would imply. Consumption does follow a random
walk, but some permanent shocks (innovations ηt) are insured and thus do not
affect consumption. In other words, consumption in our model exhibits “excess
smoothness” (as originally defined by Campbell and Deaton 1989). It is precisely
this feature of the data that has motivated a large amount of recent research
aimed at developing “partial insurance” models that lie in between the bond
economy and complete markets (e.g., Krueger and Perri 2006; Ales and Maziero
2009; Attanasio and Pavoni 2011).
C. Tractability of the framework
With few exceptions, incomplete-markets models do not admit an analytical so-
lution and numerical methods are required to solve for equilibrium allocations.12
In this section we explain how we retain tractability, and we relate this result to
the existing literature. Readers who are more interested in the empirical appli-
cation can skip directly to Section II.
12In standard (intractable) incomplete-markets models, decision rules depend on wealth, and the dis-
tribution of wealth is endogenous and must be solved for numerically. The literature has followed three
alternative routes to avoid this outcome. The first is to assume a statistical model for income risk
(permanent, multiplicative shocks) such that the equilibrium wealth distribution remains degenerate at
zero (Constantinides and Duffie 1996). The second is to assume a preference specification – quadratic
or in the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) class – such that the precautionary motive for saving
is either zero or independent of wealth (Caballero 1990). The third is to allow agents to control the
amount of idiosyncratic risk that they face such that equilibrium exposure to idiosyncratic risk is pro-
portional to wealth, given CRRA preferences (Krebs 2003; Angeletos 2007). Tom Krebs (2003) allows
for human capital accumulation, so that agents can control the composition between (safe) physical and
(risky) human wealth independently of total wealth by making savings choices in both assets. George-
Marios Angeletos (2007) models idiosyncratic risk to entrepreneurial business income rather than labor
income. In his model, agents control portfolio exposure to idiosyncratic risk by adjusting the quantity of
entrepreneurial capital in total savings.
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How we retain tractability
The two keys to tractability in our framework are: (i) individual wealth is a
redundant state variable, and (ii) agents have access to perfect insurance against
some shocks and no explicit insurance against others. To achieve this insurance
dichotomy as an equilibrium outcome, the island-economy structure is important.
Why wealth is a redundant state The reason individual wealth is a redun-
dant state variable is twofold. First, even though the within-island equilibrium
wealth distribution is nondegenerate, allocations can be characterized without ref-
erence to it: full insurance within the island implies that within-island allocations
can be derived by solving an island-level planner problem with an equal-weight
welfare function corresponding to common initial asset positions for all agents,
subject to an island-level resource constraint.
Second, the inter-island wealth distribution does not show up in allocations
because, in equilibrium, this distribution remains degenerate at zero. This second
argument can be explained in three simple steps. To understand why there is no
asset trade between islands, it is sufficient to understand why there is no trade
in a risk-free bond.13 Let rt+1 = − logQt(S) denote the equilibrium interest rate
and ρ = − log β the discount rate. In the model, individuals have three saving
motives: an intertemporal motive proportional to the gap between rt+1 and ρ,
a smoothing motive linked to expected earnings growth over the life cycle, and
a precautionary motive that is a function of the variance of uninsurable island-
level shocks vω,t+1. Importantly, each of these three factors applies with the same
force on all islands. The strength of the intertemporal motive is given by the
term (rt+1 − ρ) /γ, common across agents. All islands have the same smoothing
motive because island-level expected earnings growth is independent of age and
of the current wage. The precautionary motive is the same because all agents face
the same variance for the uninsurable component of wages. Consequently, there
exists an economy-wide interest rate rt+1 at which, in equilibrium, the (negative)
intertemporal motive exactly offsets the (negative) smoothing motive and the
(positive) precautionary motive, and no agent wants to either borrow or lend
across islands.
To gain more intuition, making a specific distributional assumption is useful. If
each variable xt ∈ (ωt, ηt, θt) is distributed Normally, xt ∼ N (−vxt/2, vxt), then
asset prices can be derived in closed form. Focusing, for simplicity, on the special
case σ →∞ (inelastic labor supply) and τ = 0 (proportional taxation), we have
(8)
rt+1 − ρ
γ
+ (1 + γ)
vω,t+1
2
= 0.
The first term measures the intertemporal motive to save. The second term,
capturing the precautionary motive for saving, is equal to half the variance of the
13Recall that inter-island insurance prices are simply event-specific probabilities times the bond price.
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island-level productivity shocks times the coefficient of relative prudence, (1+γ).
The equilibrium interest rate is such that the two saving motives exactly offset.14
Insurance dichotomy Our model of risk and insurance (two types of shocks,
one insurable and one uninsurable) stands in contrast to the standard approach
(e.g., Huggett 1993), in which there is a single shock to wages that can be partially
smoothed. Our model is tractable, whereas the standard model is not. But which
structure is most empirically relevant? The sharp insurability dichotomy in our
model is certainly extreme, but it is broadly consistent with the idea that some
wage changes are much more insurable than others. For example, as Hamish Low,
Costas Meghir and Luigi Pistaferri (2010) emphasize, insurance against job loss
and severe health deterioration exists through explicit institutional arrangements,
such as unemployment compensation and disability insurance. In addition, one
should expect individuals to perfectly smooth forecastable wage changes, such as
automatic raises linked to tenure. In contrast, no explicit insurance exists against
many other shocks – such as unanticipated wage drops linked to long-lasting
reductions in the demand for specific skills or occupations.
Note that although our description of the environment assumes that (i) all
individual insurance arises from explicit markets and state-contingent financial
income flows, and (ii) wage growth is unpredictable, one could generalize both
assumptions. The same allocations for consumption and hours worked can be
supported through a combination of nonmarket mechanisms, including public
insurance programs, within-family state-contingent transfers, and spousal labor
supply. Moreover, if agents could perfectly foresee future innovations (ηt, θt), then
trade in a noncontingent bond would suffice to allow them to perfectly smooth
consumption in response to these wage changes. We use the label “insurable
shocks” as a catchall for both insurable (through market and nonmarket mecha-
nisms) and forecastable wage changes.15 We will let the data discipline the overall
amount of insurance individuals have access to, over and above progressive taxa-
tion and own labor supply, without digging further into its precise origins.
Island structure The island configuration allows to achieve the equilibrium
outcome in which some shocks are perfectly insured while others remain unin-
sured. Because unrestricted contracts are only exchanged within the island, this
partition prevents agents from pooling the island-level risk.16
14See eq. (A5) in the Online Appendix A for the interest rate expression with σ finite and τ 6= 0. If
γ > 1, then hours respond negatively to uninsurable shocks (see eq. 6). In this case, a higher Frisch
elasticity reduces the precautionary saving motive, since labor supply provides a useful hedge against
risk. Tax progressivity (τ > 0) reduces the precautionary saving motive.
15Flavio Cunha, James J. Heckman and Salvador Navarro (2005) and Fatih Guvenen and Anthony A.
Smith (2010), among others, explain the difficulty in distinguishing, empirically, between insurable shocks
and predictable changes to income.
16A similar modeling design is common in international economics, where perfect insurance is often
assumed against idiosyncratic risk within a country, whereas only a bond can be traded internationally
to smooth country-level shocks (see, for example, Baxter and Crucini 1995).
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The sorts of insurance contracts that can be traded within and between islands
are specified exogenously. Exploring whether differential information frictions
are a viable micro-foundation for this differential availability of insurance is of
some importance, but it goes beyond the scope of this paper. As a starting
point, one may assume that within-island information about shocks and insurance
contracts is perfect, but that neither individual shocks nor individual insurance
arrangements can be observed across islands (as in Cole and Kocherlakota 2001;
Ales and Maziero 2011). The first assumption allows for full insurance within
islands. The second may make it impossible to improve insurance of island-level
shocks beyond what can be achieved through trade in a risk-free bond.
Finally, the reader might wonder what the empirical counterpart of an island
is. For expositional simplicity, we have assumed that households are permanently
assigned to an island and, therefore, always trade insurance contracts within the
same set of agents, all of whom experience a common sequence of ωt shocks. Un-
der this implementation of the island structure, an island comprises households
whose consumption comoves closely over long periods of time. One particularly
appealing empirical counterpart to a model island would then be a network of fam-
ily members. Under such an interpretation, idiosyncratic risks within the family
(model εt) would be perfectly pooled, whereas any common component to family
wages (model αt) would remain uninsured. Such a common component arises
naturally if family members are concentrated within regions, occupations, or skill
levels and therefore are unable to diversify region-, occupation-, or skill-specific
shocks.17 However, it is important to note that identical equilibrium allocations
arise under an alternative implementation of the island structure, according to
which a risk-sharing group at date t is defined only by a common ωt+1 instead
of a common sequence {ωt+1, ωt+2, ...}.
18 Under this implementation, the theory
has many fewer restrictions that can be tested empirically: an island is just a
group of agents pooling a subset of idiosyncratic shocks at a point in time, whose
consumption need not be correlated in the long run. In the special case in which
insurable shocks are i.i.d. over time, the island structure can be dispensed with
altogether.19
As we show in Sections II and III, for identification and estimation of the
model, it is enough to use economy-wide cross-sectional moments. Because these
moments aggregate dispersion within and between groups, we do not need to
determine empirical counterparts to model islands.
17Angelucci, De Georgio, and Rasul (2012) provide some empirical evidence consistent with this view.
18To see this, note that our decentralization assumes trade in insurance contracts indexed only to
one period ahead realizations for (ωt+1, ηt+1, θt+1). Moreover, the only important restriction on the
pattern of trade is that the set of agents trading these contracts will all draw the same (unknown) ωt+1
innovation.
19In particular, if κt = 0 for all t so that εt = θt, then an alternative way to implement the equilibrium
allocations described in the text is to assume that agents first observe the innovation ωt, and then trade
– economy-wide – insurance claims contingent only on the realization of the transitory component θt.
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Relation to Constantinides and Duffie (1996)
Constantinides and Duffie (1996), henceforth CD, is an important forebear of
our model. The key insight of CD is that a no-trade equilibrium exists when:
(1) the exogenous process for disposable income is a multiplicative unit root with
innovations drawn from a distribution common to all agents, (2) preferences are
in the power utility class, (3) assets are in zero net supply, and agents are endowed
with zero initial wealth.20 We extend CD’s environment in four dimensions that
are important for a quantitative study of risk sharing.
First, our primitive exogenous stochastic process is over hourly wages and also
includes a transitory component beyond the unit root. Gross earnings are endoge-
nous since individuals control their labor supply. Showing that the no-trade result
extends to preferences defined over labor supply as well as consumption is impor-
tant because, as will become clear shortly, data on hours worked are a rich source
of information on the nature of risk and risk sharing. In Jonathan Heathcote,
Kjetil Storesletten and Giovanni L. Violante (2011b) we generalize the preference
class under which the no-trade result holds beyond our baseline specification (2).
We provide a simple static sufficient condition that can be used to check whether
there exists an equilibrium with no inter-island trade, for any particular utility
function defined over consumption and hours worked. We use this condition to
show that the no-trade result extends to Greenwood-Hercowitz-Huffman, Cobb-
Douglas, and recursive Epstein-Zin preferences. These alternative specifications
also deliver closed-form expressions for equilibrium allocations.
Second, we allow for progressive taxation, which allows us to quantify the role
of the tax system in consumption smoothing.
Third, agents in our model differ with respect to preferences, in addition to
productivity. This feature is important because we do not want to impose a
priori that the entire cross-sectional dispersion in consumption and hours worked
is driven by dispersion in wages.
Finally, and most importantly, in our economy some risks are insurable within
islands, so our version of the no-trade result applies across groups rather than
across individuals. Hence, our model allows for partial consumption insurance
against disposable earnings shocks – a critical requirement for bringing the model
to the data successfully (as shown by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston 2008).
In contrast, the most direct interpretation of the CD model is that theirs is a
world with no risk sharing in which each individual consumes his or her endow-
ment. An alternative interpretation is that their postulated endowment process is
“posttrade” and incorporates nonmodeled risk-sharing mechanisms against fun-
damental shocks. Relative to this alternative interpretation, the advantage of our
setup is that we explicitly model and quantify the risk-sharing channels available
20Both CD’s model and ours can have assets in positive net supply in a trivial case, namely when
agents are endowed at birth with a unit of the market portfolio and pay a lump-sum tax each period
equal to the dividend on the market portfolio each period. In equilibrium, agents never trade away from
their initial holding of the market portfolio, rendering the allocations (5)-(6) unchanged.
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to households: labor supply (from wages to earnings), progressive taxation (from
pretax to posttax earnings), and additional insurance (from posttax earnings to
consumption).
II. Cross-sectional implications
The model has thus far abstracted from variation in household composition,
while actual households in the data vary with respect to household size and the
number of potential workers. Moreover, measurement error is pervasive in micro
data. In this section, we first describe how to augment our theoretical allocations
to address these two issues. Next, we use these augmented theoretical allocations
to derive, and interpret, closed-form expressions for (co-)variances of the equi-
librium cross-sectional joint distribution of consumption, hours, and wages – the
key moments used for model identification and estimation.
A. Augmented theoretical allocations
Modeling household composition To address the first issue, we generalize
the model to explicitly incorporate variation in household size. This extension de-
livers a theoretically coherent approach for controlling for household composition
in the data.
Let g and k denote the number of adults (grown-ups) and children (kids) in
a particular household. All members of a given household reside on the same
island. Let e (g, k) be a function that defines the economies of scale enjoyed by
a household of type (g, k) such that effective per-person consumption is given
by household consumption c divided by e(g, k), where e(1, 0) is normalized to
unity. Children receive no weight in household utility. Thus period utility for a
household of type (ϕ, g, k) is given by
u (c, {hi}
g
i=1 ;ϕ, g, k) =
g
1− γ
(
c
e (g, k)
)1−γ
−
exp (ϕ)
1 + σ
g∑
i=1
h1+σi .
One could make alternative assumptions regarding whether agents can insure ex
ante against the type (g, k) of household to which they are allocated. In Appendix
B, we solve for allocations in the two polar cases where there is full insurance and
no insurance against (g, k). The key difference between the two models is that
the full insurance model implies that hours worked should be independent of
household composition, while the no-insurance model implies that hours should
vary systematically with household size (when γ 6= 1). The reason household type
does not affect equilibrium hours in the insurable household composition model
is that household type has no impact on productivity or the disutility of labor
effort, and thus it would be inefficient for individuals in different-size households
to work different numbers of hours.
Motivated by this distinction, we experimented with regressing log hours on
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household composition dummies. Conditional on annual hours being positive,
household composition explains essentially none of the observed variation in hours
worked on the intensive margin, which is evidence in favor of the insurable model
of household composition.
In Appendix B we show that with full insurance against household composition,
total consumption is given by
log cat
(
st; g, k
)
= log cat
(
st; 1, 0
)
+D (g, k) ,
where log cat
(
st; 1, 0
)
, consumption for a single-adult household, is given by equa-
tion (5), and D(g, k) is given by
(9) D (g, k) ≡
1
γ
log g −
(
1− γ
γ
)
log e (g, k) .
From this expression it is clear that if γ = 1 or e(g, k) = g, then households are
allocated consumption exactly in proportion to the number of adults g, so there
are no transfers between households of different size. Suppose there are economies
of scale from additional adults (so that e(g, 0) < g for g > 1). Then larger
households are allocated less consumption per adult than smaller households if
and only if γ > 1. On the one hand, economies of scale make it inexpensive to
increase effective consumption c/e(g, k) for large households — in the limit γ → 0
this effect makes it efficient to allocate all consumption to the largest households.
On the other hand, for γ > 0, economies of scale mean that for the same level
of consumption per adult, larger households enjoy a lower marginal utility of
consumption. If γ > 1 this second effect dominates.
With prior knowledge of the appropriate equivalence scale e (g, k) and the risk
aversion parameter γ, one could purge variation in household size from the data
by applying eq. (9) directly. Instead we choose to be agnostic ex ante about the
function e (g, k) and simply regress log household consumption on a full set of
composition dummies. In the same consumption regression, we also strip out the
age/time dummies C˜at (by including a quartic polynomial in age and a full set of
year dummies), and run similar regressions (minus the composition dummies, as
dictated by the theory) for individual wages and hours.21
Measurement error We assume that consumption, earnings, and hours worked
are measured with error and that this error is classical, i.e., i.i.d. over time and
across agents. The log of the observed value for variable xt is then log xˆt =
log xt + µ
x
t , where measurement error µ
x
t has mean zero and variance vµx. While
we directly observe consumption, hours, and earnings, we compute hourly wages
as earnings divided by hours. Hence measurement error in hourly wages reflects
errors in both earnings and hours.
21Note that the polynomial in age also eliminates life-cycle effects in wages, hours, and consumption
that we do not model.
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Augmented allocations Augmented log allocations at time t are therefore
given by
log wˆt = αt + κt + θt + µ
y
t − µ
h
t
log cˆt = − (1− τ) ϕ̂+ (1− τ)
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)
αt + µ
c
t
log hˆt = −ϕ̂+
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
αt +
1
σ̂
εt + µ
h
t ,
where, recall, ϕ̂ denotes the rescaled preference weight.
B. Interpreting cross-sectional variances and covariances
With these allocations in hand, we can express in closed-form cross-sectional
moments of the joint equilibrium distribution of wages, hours, and consumption.
These theoretical moments represent an attractive feature of our framework, since
they allow us to transparently interpret the dynamics of their empirical counter-
parts over the life cycle and over time.
We will focus on variances and covariances across all agents of age a at date t.
These moments reflect dispersion both within and between islands. An important
theoretical property of our framework (see Section III.A) is that the information
contained in these aggregate cross-sectional (co-)variances of wages, hours, and
consumption is sufficient to identify all model parameters and to quantify risk
sharing.22
We start from the moments in levels, which we call the “macro moments” and
then move to those in differences, which we will refer to as the “micro moments.”
Macro moments Let varat (α) denote the within-cohort variance of cumulated
permanent uninsurable shocks (up until) period t for agents of age a:
varat (α) = vα0,t−a +
a−1∑
j=0
vω,t−j .
Similarly, let varat (ϕ̂) = vϕ̂,t−a denote the cohort (t − a)-specific variance of the
rescaled preference weights, and let varat (ε) = vκ0,t−a +
∑a−1
j=0 vη,t−j + vθt be the
variance of the insurable component of the wage for cohorts of age a in year t.
The macro moments for wages and hours for age group a at date t are, respec-
22Note also that we do not need any data on wealth when estimating the model. Longitudinal wealth
data could shed further light on how households smooth wage fluctuations (see, e.g., Krueger and Perri
2010). In particular, wealth dynamics might help with the difficult task of distinguishing insurable shocks
from predictable changes in wages.
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tively,
varat (log wˆ) = var
a
t (α) + var
a
t (ε) + vµy + vµh(10)
varat
(
log hˆ
)
= varat (ϕ̂) +
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)2
varat (α) +
1
σ̂2
varat (ε) + vµh(11)
covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
=
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
varat (α) +
1
σ̂
varat (ε) − vµh.(12)
The variance of measured wages is the sum of variances of the orthogonal pro-
ductivity components, plus the variances of measurement error in earnings and
hours. The variance of hours has four components. First, the more heterogene-
ity in the taste for leisure ϕ, the larger is the cross-sectional dispersion in hours.
Second, the variance of the uninsurable shock translates into hours dispersion pro-
portionately to 1 − γ. As γ → 1 (the log-consumption case), uninsurable shocks
have no effect on hours. Third, the variance of the insurable shocks increases hours
dispersion in proportion to the (squared) tax-modified Frisch elasticity. Finally,
measurement error in hours contributes positively to observed dispersion.
The covariance between wages and hours has three components. The effect of
uninsurable wage shocks on this covariance depends on the value for γ. If γ > 1,
then uninsurable shocks decrease the wage-hours covariance, since strong income
effects induce low wage (uninsured) workers to work longer hours. Insurable
shocks, by contrast, make hours and wages move together. Measurement error in
hours reduces the observed covariance between hours and wages (earnings divided
by hours).
We now turn to the moments involving consumption:
varat (log cˆ) = (1− τ)
2 varat (ϕ̂) + (1− τ)
2
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)2
varat (α) + vµc(13)
covat
(
log hˆ, log cˆ
)
= (1− τ) varat (ϕ̂) +
(1− τ) (1 + σ̂) (1− γ)
(σ̂ + γ)2
varat (α)(14)
covat (log wˆ, log cˆ) = (1− τ)
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)
varat (α).(15)
The variance of consumption is increasing in the variance of uninsurable pref-
erence heterogeneity and uninsurable wage shocks, as expected. Progressive tax-
ation (τ > 0) reduces the variance of consumption for a given varat (α). The role
of labor supply depends on the value for γ: for γ > 1 a lower σ (higher Frisch)
reduces consumption dispersion because labor supply offsets uninsurable wage
shocks and dampens their impact on earnings.
The covariance between hours and consumption is increasing in the degree of
preference heterogeneity, since individuals with higher ϕ work relatively few hours
and thus earn and consume relatively less. The effect of uninsurable wage risk
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depends on the value of γ: when γ > 1, a positive uninsurable shock reduces
hours worked but increases consumption.
The covariance between consumption and wages depends only on uninsurable
wage shocks: fluctuations in uninsurable productivity affect both wages and con-
sumption in the same direction. As expected, progressive taxation reduces this
covariance.23
Dispersion over the life cycle Let ∆varat (log xˆ) = var
a
t (log xˆ)−var
a−1
t−1 (log xˆ)
be the within-cohort change (i.e., between age a − 1 in year t − 1 and age a in
year t) in the variance of log xˆ. The model has sharp predictions for the life-cycle
evolution of dispersion:
∆varat (log wˆ) = vωt + vηt +∆vθt(16)
∆varat
(
log hˆ
)
=
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)2
vωt +
1
σ̂2
(vηt +∆vθt)(17)
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
=
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
vωt +
1
σ̂
(vηt +∆vθt)(18)
∆varat (log cˆ) = (1− τ)
2
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)2
vωt(19)
∆covat
(
log hˆ, log cˆ
)
= (1− τ)
(1− γ) (1 + σ̂)
(σ̂ + γ)2
vωt
∆covat (log wˆ, log cˆ) = (1− τ)
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)
vωt.
None of these moments involve measurement error, reflecting our assumption
that the variance of measurement error is independent of age and time. Moreover,
because all shocks in our economy are either permanent or i.i.d., all of these
moments are independent of age.
The rise in wage inequality over the life cycle is determined by the variance of
the innovations to the permanent insurable and uninsurable components, and by
the change in the variance of the transitory insurable component. Wage dispersion
will increase over the life cycle as permanent shocks cumulate. The model suggests
that the variance of hours should be increasing over the life cycle for the same
reasons as wages, though with different weights on the insurable and uninsurable
permanent variances. In the log-consumption utility case (γ = 1), only the former
matters for hours.
23Since we have filtered out differences in mean values for allocations across age groups, the expressions
for dispersion in the entire cross section are identical to those above, but without the age a superscripts.
This follows from the variance decomposition vart (x) = E [varat (x)] + vart [E (x|a)], where the second
term is zero if we abstract from the terms C˜at and H˜
a
t in the allocations. Thus, for example, vart (log wˆ) =
vart(α) + vart(ε) + vµy + vµh, where vart(α) = (1− δ)
∑
∞
a=0 δ
avarat (α) is the unconditional cross-
sectional variance of the uninsurable component of log wages, and vart(ε) is the corresponding variance
for the insurable component of wages.
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Whether the covariance between wages and hours rises or falls over the life cycle
depends on risk aversion and the relative size of permanent and transitory innova-
tions. When γ > 1, the cumulation of permanent uninsurable shocks pushes the
covariance down as individuals age, while the cumulation of permanent insurable
shocks pulls the covariance up.
The change in the variance of consumption over the life cycle is determined
by the variance of uninsurable productivity shocks. The uninsurable-wage-shock
coefficient for consumption is exactly one when τ = 0 and either γ = 1 or σ →∞.
When γ > 1, hours move up in response to a negative uninsurable wage shock,
while consumption moves down, driving the consumption-hours covariance down
over the life cycle as varat (α) rises with age. Finally, the model predicts that the
covariance between consumption and wages will increase over the life cycle, in
proportion to vωt.
Micro moments Micro moments are computed as variances and covariances
of individual changes in log wages and log hours between t − 1 and t.24 Let
∆ log xˆt ≡ log xˆt−log xˆt−1 denote the observed individual growth rate for variable
xˆ, and let varat (∆ log xˆ) be its cross-sectional variance, for the set of individuals
of age a at date t for whom variable xˆ is observed at both t− 1 and t :
varat (∆ log wˆ) = vωt + vηt + vθt + vθ,t−1 + 2vµy + 2vµh(20)
varat
(
∆ log hˆ
)
=
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)2
vωt +
1
σ̂2
(vηt + vθt + vθ,t−1) + 2vµh(21)
covat
(
∆ log wˆ,∆ log hˆ
)
=
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
vωt +
1
σ̂
(vηt + vθt + vθ,t−1)− 2vµh(22)
Again, the model implies that the variances and covariances of individual
growth rates should be invariant to age and thus common across cohorts. Similar
expressions obtain for second differences in wages and hours. For example, the
variance of wage growth over a two-year horizon is
(23) varat
(
∆2 log wˆ
)
= vωt + vω,t−1 + vηt + vη,t−1 + vθt + vθ,t−2 + 2vµy + 2vµh.
As we shall see, such moments are especially useful for exploiting the PSID data
in the years when the survey was conducted biannually.
Finally, note that all of our cross-sectional moments are the sum of additively
separable terms capturing the roles of preference heterogeneity, insurable pro-
ductivity shocks, uninsurable productivity shocks, and measurement error. This
implies that (co-)variance decompositions are always unique, in sharp contrast to
24Given the specification of the stochastic process for shocks and measurement error, in the model
covariances of the individual changes are all zero beyond lag one. Moreover, we omit moments involving
changes in consumption, since we do not use the longitudinal dimension of CEX. The panel aspect of
CEX is quite weak. It consists of two, generally noisy, observations spaced nine months apart. See
Steven J. Davis (2004) for a discussion.
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the existing literature (e.g., Keane and Wolpin 1997; Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron 2004a; Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante 2010b), where decompositions
must be obtained by simulation, and where the sequence in which various model
ingredients are added or removed typically affects their measured contribution to
moments of interest. In Section IV.D we document our decompositions in detail.
III. Identification, data, and estimation
In this section, we first exploit the closed-form cross-sectional moments to prove
identification of the model parameters. Next, we describe the data used for the
structural estimation, and finally we discuss our estimation method. We estimate
all structural parameters except δ and τ, which are set exogenously. Both macro
and micro moments contain valuable information about parameters, and both are
used to identify and estimate the model.
A. Identification
Typically, identification in estimated structural equilibrium models is discussed
only at an informal level, because the mapping from parameters to equilibrium
moments can at most be weakly illuminated by numerical experimentation. In
contrast, our closed-form expressions for equilibrium allocations deliver explicit
analytical links between structural parameters and equilibrium moments, enabling
us to prove identification formally and lending transparency to the empirical
analysis. This is one of the key payoffs from the tractability of our framework.
The conditions for identification depend on data availability. We therefore con-
sider an array of different scenarios. Our baseline scenario (Proposition 2 below)
is that one has access to an unbalanced panel on wages and hours (e.g., the PSID)
and a repeated cross section on wages, hours, and consumption (e.g., the CEX).
Next, we consider several variants encompassing alternative data structures.
PROPOSITION 2: [identification] With an unbalanced panel on wages and
hours and a repeated cross section on consumption, wages, and hours from t =
1, ..., T , the parameters {σ, γ, vµh, vµy , vµc} as well as the sequences
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t
}T
t=1
,
{vκ0t, vθt}
T−1
t=1 , {vωt}
T
t=2 and {vηt}
T−1
t=2 are identified. The sums vηT + vθT and
vκ0T + vθT are also identified.
Proof. See Appendix C.
We now consider two alternative data structures that reflect additional limita-
tions of available survey data for the United States. The first constraint is that
consumption data in the CEX are available only from 1980, whereas the PSID
starts in 1967. The second limitation is that, starting in 1996, the PSID becomes
biannual. Since we estimate the model by combining the PSID and the CEX,
these next two corollaries are important for us.
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Corollary 2.1 [limited consumption data] Suppose available data com-
prise an unbalanced panel on wages and hours from t = 1, ..., T and a repeated
cross section on consumption, wages, and hours for at least two years tˆ and tˆ+1,
where 1 ≤ tˆ < T . Then, parameter identification is exactly as in Proposition 2.
Corollary 2.2 [biannual panel data] Suppose available data comprise an
unbalanced panel on wages and hours and a repeated cross section on wages, hours,
and consumption, where the cross-sectional data on consumption are annual for
all years t = 1, ..., T, while the panel data on wages and hours are annual only un-
til year tˆ and biannual thereafter, i.e., data are available for the years t = 1, 2, ..., tˆ
and t = tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T −2, T . Then, one can identify {σ, γ, vµh, vµy , vµc}, the se-
quences
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t
}T
t=1
, {vωt}
T
t=2 , {vθt, vκ0t}
tˆ
t=1, {vηt}
tˆ
t=2, and {vθt, vκ0t, vη,t−1 + vηt}
for the years t = tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T − 2, as well as the sums {vη,T−1 + vη,T + vθ,T }
and
{
vκ0,T + vθ,T
}
.
These two corollaries are proved in Appendix C. It is also straightforward to
prove that, up to the composition of insurable shocks (i.e., the split between
vθt, vηt, and vκ0t), the model is also identified with only cross-sectional data on
consumption, hours, and wages –for example, with data from the CEX alone.25
Polynomial model for the variances Small sample sizes and data quality
issues might preclude precise point estimates of year-specific shock variances.
One way to reduce the information needed in estimation is to restrict the time
series for the variances to follow time polynomials. In the baseline estimation, we
follow this approach and model the time paths for the variances of insurable and
uninsurable innovations {vηt, vωt} as fourth-order time polynomials. This choice
allows us to estimate a more parsimonious model (the number of parameters is
reduced from 232 to 164) that can still capture the low-frequency movements
in insurable and uninsurable wage risk in which we are interested.26 Moreover,
this restriction improves overall identification, as we demonstrate in the following
corollary to Proposition 2 (proved in Appendix C).
Corollary 2.3 [time-polynomials for (vηt, vωt)] Suppose the sequences
{vηt, vωt}
T
t=1 are modelled as time-polynomials of order T − 3 or lower. Then,
with an unbalanced panel on wages and hours, and a repeated cross section on con-
sumption, wages, and hours from t = 1, ..., T , the parameters {σ, γ, vµh, vµy, vµc}
as well as all the entire sequences
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t, vκ0t, vθt, vωt, vηt
}T
t=1
are identified.
Analogous modifications on identification can be easily shown for the alternative
data structures corresponding to Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2.
25To see this, note that Step A of the proof of Proposition 2 identifies σ, γ, {vωt}
T
t=2 , and
{vηt +∆vθt}
T
t=2. Following Step C of the same proof, one identifies
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t
}T
t=1
and {vκ0t + vθt}
T
t=1 .
Measurement error
{
vµy , vµh, vµc
}
is identified following Step D.
26We chose to restrict only vηt and vωt to follow time polynomials because (as we explain in Section
IV) those variances, when unconstrained, were by far the most volatile and least precisely estimated. In
some years, point estimates hit the zero lower bound, suggesting a practical identification problem.
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Identification via labor supply
It is well understood in the literature that consumption data can be used to
differentiate between insurable and uninsurable shocks (see, e.g., Attanasio and
Davis 1996; Blundell and Preston 1998; Guvenen and Smith 2010). Proposition
2 and its corollaries expand this earlier research by introducing data on hours
worked alongside consumption to obtain sharper identification. We now prove
that, under a weak additional restriction on measurement error, the whole model
can be identified without using any consumption data.
PROPOSITION 3: [identification with no consumption data] With an
unbalanced panel on wages and hours from t = 1, ..., T , and an external estimate
of measurement error in earnings vµy, all the parameters listed in Proposition 2
are identified.
Proof. See Online Appendix C1.27
Why are data on labor supply informative about risk sharing and preference
parameters? At a basic level, the logic is that theory has sharply different im-
plications for the response of hours to uninsurable versus insurable shocks, just
as for consumption. Households adjust hours worked more strongly in response
to latter type of wage fluctuations, because of the absence of offsetting wealth
effects. Moreover, the magnitudes of these responses are mediated by preference
parameters.
B. Data
Our data are drawn from two surveys, the Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID), and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). We use PSID
data for interview years 1968-2007 (which refer to calendar years 1967-2006).
After the 1997 interview, the PSID becomes biannual, so we only have data for
survey years 1968-1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007. We use CEX data
from the quarterly Interview Surveys. Consistent and continuous data over time
are available annually since 1980, hence we restrict attention to the 1980-2006
surveys.28
Since we jointly use both PSID and CEX data, we apply the same sample se-
lection criteria to both datasets. Namely, we exclude badly incomplete or highly
27Proposition 3 has two immediate implications. First, with an unbalanced panel, only a very short
longitudinal dimension is required: all parameters are identified with a three-year panel. Second, the
model could alternatively be estimated with longitudinal data on wages and hours for a single cohort.
Therefore, besides the PSID, the model can be estimated on the SIPP or the NLSY. With a two-year
panel (for example, the rotating panel of the CPS) all parameters are identified, except for vηt.
28In the PSID, we exclude all PSID oversamples (SEO, Latino) so we do not need sample weights,
while for CEX computations sample weights are used throughout.
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implausible observations.29 We use an imputation procedure to adjust for top-
coding based on the Pareto distribution. We then select households in which
the male is between the ages of 25 and 59, and works at least 260 hours in the
year.30 In both datasets, the hourly wage is computed as annual pretax labor
earnings divided by annual hours worked.31 To avoid severe selection issues, we
use wages and hours for males only. Our measure of household consumption in-
cludes expenditures on nondurables, services, small durables, and an estimate of
the service flow from vehicles and housing. All nominal variables are deflated
using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). Our PSID and CEX samples are up-
dated versions of those constructed by Jonathan Heathcote, Fabrizio Perri and
Giovanni L. Violante (2010). We refer to that paper for a detailed description of
these two surveys, the sample selection, and exact variable definitions.
As discussed in Section II.A, we regress individual log wages, individual log
hours, and household log consumption on year dummies, a quartic in age, and
(for consumption) household composition dummies.
We then use the residuals from these regressions to construct variances and
covariances in levels and differences for all available age/year cells constructed by
grouping observations in any given year into 31 five-year overlapping age classes
(27-57).32 From the PSID data we construct (i) 1,085 age/year covariances cor-
responding to 31 age groups over 35 years (1967-1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004,
2006) for each of the three moments in levels involving wages and hours; (ii)
899 age/year covariances corresponding to 31 age groups over 29 years for each
of the three moments in first differences; and (iii) 1,203 age/year covariances
corresponding to 31 age groups over 33 years for each of the three moments in
second differences. From the CEX data, we construct 837 age/year covariances
corresponding to 31 age groups over 27 years (1980-2006) for each of the three
moments in levels involving consumption.
29We drop records if 1) there is no information on age for either the head or the spouse, 2) if either the
head or spouse has positive labor income but zero annual hours, and 3) if either the head or spouse has
an hourly wage less than half of the corresponding federal minimum wage in that year. In the CEX, we
drop households that report implausibly low quarterly consumption expenditures (less than $100, in 2000
dollars). In order to reduce measurement error, we also exclude CEX households flagged as “incomplete
income reporters.”
30The resulting unbalanced panel from the PSID comprises 2,930 individuals and 93,153 person-year
observations. The resulting repeated cross sections from the CEX have a total of 87,966 household-year
observations (on average, 3,258 households per year).
31Labor earnings are defined in both surveys as the sum of all income from wages, salaries, commissions,
bonuses, and overtime, and the labor component of self-employment income.
32For example, the variance of log wages for the youngest age group (age class 27) at date t is
constructed with all wage observations for individuals aged 25-29 at date t, the variance of log wages
for the next age group (age class 28) at date t is constructed with all wage observations for individuals
aged 26-30 at date t, and similarly for all other age groups until the oldest one (age class 57). Since
the number of observations in many one-year age cells is very small, this procedure reduces sampling
variation. We apply the same procedure to construct the model analogue of these moments.
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C. Estimation method
The structural estimation of the model uses the minimum distance estimator
introduced by Gary Chamberlain (1984), which minimizes a weighted squared sum
of the differences between each moment in the model and its data counterpart.
Let m (Λ) denote the (J × 1) vector of theoretical covariances, and Λ denote
the (N × 1) vector of parameter values to estimate. Correspondingly, we define
mˆ as the vector of empirical covariances. The estimator solves the following
minimization problem:
min
Λ
[mˆ−m (Λ)]′W [mˆ−m (Λ)] ,
where W is a (J × J) weighting matrix. Standard asymptotic theory implies
that the estimator Λ̂ is consistent and asymptotically Normal. Due to the small
sample size, we make two choices: (i) we use an identity matrix for W;33 (ii) we
compute 90–10 confidence intervals through a block-bootstrap procedure based
on 500 replications.34
The discussion of identification in Section III.A indicates that, absent addi-
tional assumptions, one cannot identify some of the time-varying parameters in
the missing PSID survey years. We describe the minor technical identifying as-
sumptions needed to overcome this issue in Appendix D. Moreover, we assume
that prior to 1967 the variances of all shocks were equal, in each year, to their
respective values in 1967.35 Overall, the estimation uses J = 11, 532 moment
conditions for N = 164 parameters.
Parameters set outside the model We set δ = 0.996 to match the annu-
alized probability of surviving from age 25 to age 60 for US men.36 To estimate
the progressivity parameter τ , for each household in our PSID sample we com-
pute after-tax income as income minus all federal and state taxes (calculated
using the NBER’s TAXSIM program) plus social security benefits. We exclude
state-contingent government transfers in the form of cash (e.g., UI benefits and
TANF) or kind (e.g., food stamps and Medicaid) since, as discussed earlier, this
type of social assistance is subsumed in our estimate of insurance with respect
33The bulk of the literature follows this strategy, in light of the Monte Carlo simulations of Joseph
Altonji and Lewis M. Segal (1996) who argue that in common applications there is a substantial small
sample bias when using the optimal weighting matrix characterized by Chamberlain (1984).
34Bootstrap samples are drawn at the household level with each sample containing the same number
of observations as the original sample. The implied confidence intervals thus account for arbitrary serial
correlation, heteroscedasticity, and estimation error induced by the first-stage regression of individual
observations on age, time, and household type.
35Alternatively, we could have treated the cumulative variances of the insurable and uninsurable
components for the cohorts alive in 1967, i.e., {vκa,1967, vαa,1967}
57
a=27, as parameters to be estimated.
When pursuing this alternative estimation strategy, we found the results to be virtually identical to those
under the baseline “steady-state” identification scheme.
36The survival rate δ does not appear in any of the age/year moments we use to estimate the model,
and hence its calibration has no bearing on the parameter estimates. We use δ only to construct the
aggregate cross-sectional variances and covariances plotted to measure the fit of the model against the
data. The fit is extremely robust to varying δ within a plausible range.
VOL. 104 NO. X CONSUMPTION & LABOR SUPPLY WITH PARTIAL INSURANCE 27
to ε shocks.37 From eq. (3), a consistent estimate of 1 − τ can be obtained by
regressing log household after-tax income on log household pretax income, in-
cluding a constant in the regression. The ordinary least squares estimate of this
coefficient implies τ = 0.185 (s.e. = 0.001). The associated R2 measure of fit is
0.92, which demonstrates that our functional form provides a good approximation
to the actual US tax system.
IV. Results
Table 1 reports parameter estimates. Our estimates for the two preference
elasticity parameters are γ = 1.71 and σ = 2.16. In both cases the confidence
intervals are narrow. Given our assumed value for the tax progressivity parameter
τ, the implied tax-modified Frisch elasticity with respect to pretax wages is 1/σˆ =
(1− τ)/(σ+ τ) = 0.35, a value that is broadly consistent with the microeconomic
evidence (see, e.g., Keane 2011).
The average estimated values for the variances of uninsurable and insurable
permanent wage shocks (vω and vη) and corresponding cohort effects (vα0 and
vκ0) indicate that almost 45 percent of permanent life-cycle wage innovations are
insurable, while around 30 percent of initial wage variation at labor market entry
is insurable.38 The estimated average transitory wage variance is vθ = 0.043, an
order of magnitude larger than the variance of permanent shocks. The entire time
series for the variances are reported in Table E1 in the Online Appendix. Our
estimates for the variances of measurement error in log hours worked, individual
earnings, and household consumption are, respectively, 0.036, 0, and 0.041.39
A. Life-cycle fit
Figures 1 and 2 compare the evolution of model and data along the life-cycle
dimension and show that the model-implied moments align closely with their
empirical counterparts from the PSID and the CEX. In particular, the model-
implied moments almost always lie within the 90-10 confidence intervals around
the empirical moments. With the help of these figures, we offer some economic
intuition relating the life-cycle profiles for inequality to the parameter estimates
described above. We then demonstrate that each feature of the baseline model
plays an important role in accounting for the empirical moments by estimating a
set of restricted models.
[FIGURES 1 AND 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
37Since state income taxes from TAXSIM are only available from 1978, we exclude years 1967-1977 in
this calculation. See Appendix B in Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) for details.
38The total variance of permanent wage innovations is 0.01, in line with existing estimates. For
example, Low, Meghir, and Pistaferri (2010) estimate a variance of permanent wage shocks of 0.011.
39The estimate of zero measurement error in earnings might seem surprising. However, Peter
Gottschalk and Minh Huynh (2010) find that the cross-sectional variance of true earnings is greater
than the variance of measured earnings in survey data. They argue that this reflects a nonclassical
structure for measurement error in earnings.
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Table 1—Baseline Parameter Estimates
Preference Elasticities Life-Cycle Shocks
σ γ vω vη vθ
2.165 1.713 0.0056 0.0044 0.043
(0.173) (0.054) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.005)
Initial Heterogeneity Measurement Error
vα0 vκ0 vϕ̂ vµy vµh vµc
0.102 0.047 0.054 0.000 0.036 0.041
(0.030) (0.023) (0.016) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002)
Bars denote sample averages. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500
replications are shown in parentheses.
Understanding parameter estimates In both US and model-simulated
data, the variance of log wages increases by around 37 log points, approximately
linearly, between ages 27 and 57. In contrast, the variance of log consumption
grows much less, by about 10 log points over the life cycle. The much steeper
life-cycle increase in wage dispersion relative to consumption dispersion explains
why almost half of permanent shocks to wages are estimated to be insurable.
The fact that the empirical profile for the variance of log hours is fairly flat,
notwithstanding the fact that dispersion in wages increases sharply as permanent
shocks cumulate, points to a relatively low Frisch elasticity of labor supply. How-
ever, we show below that the model fits poorly if we impose exogenously a zero
Frisch elasticity.
The point estimate for γ exceeds one because the covariance between wages and
hours is negative, indicating significant wealth effects from uninsurable shocks to
wages (recall that insurable wage shocks push this covariance up).40 The frame-
work allows for one alternative way to generate a negative wage-hours covariance,
namely measurement error in hours. However, the estimation procedure does not
attribute the low covariance entirely to measurement error because this would
translate into an excessively high variance for the growth of individual hours.41
Figure 2 shows that the model also accounts well for the life-cycle moments in
first and second differences. For example, the top left and bottom left panels plot
the cross-sectional variances of annual and bi-annual log wage growth. The first
40In a similar spirit, Raj Chetty (2006) argues that existing empirical evidence on the response of
hours to permanent shocks to wages can be used to bound estimates for risk aversion. An advantage of
our fully structural approach is that we can identify γ in an environment with a mix of uninsurable and
insurable permanent wage shocks.
41Figure 1 indicates that the estimated model exaggerates the increase in the correlation between
wages and hours observed over the life cycle. A larger value for γ would improve the model’s fit in this
dimension, by amplifying the offsetting effect on hours or permanent uninsurable wage shocks. However,
a larger value for γ would also steepen the age decline in the theoretical correlation between hours and
consumption. See equations (12) and (14). Thus the estimated value for γ reflects a compromise in an
attempt to reconcile various conflicting moments.
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Table 2—Parameter Estimates for Alternative Models
Baseline (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ 2.165 2.682 2.251 ∞∗ 1.642 1.637
γ 1.713 1.483 1.849 1.713∗ 1.705 2.108
vµh 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.039 0.037
vµy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
∗
vµc 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.016 0.084 0.041
vϕ̂ 0.054 0.050 0.055 0.058 0
∗ 0.036
vα0 0.102 0.156 0.070 0.086 0.089 0.085
vω 0.0056 0
∗ 0.0093 0.0059 0.0064 0.0063
vκ0 0.047 0.014 0.082 0.051 0.065 0.067
vη 0.0044 0.0081 0
∗ 0.0056 0.0035 0.0031
vθ 0.043 0.043 0.045 0.043 0.039 0.042
1/σ̂ 0.347 0.284 0.334 0∗ 0.446 0.447
SSR 10.204 11.213 11.314 13.012 14.114 –
Externally set values are followed by an asterisk. The baseline estimates are
reproduced from Table 1. Other columns: (2) complete markets for all shocks
(vωt = 0), (3) no private insurance against permanent shocks (vηt = 0), (4) in-
elastic labor supply (σ →∞), (5) no preference heterogeneity (vϕt = 0), and (6)
baseline model without using CEX consumption data (Section IV.E). Values for
1/σ̂ are implied by the other parameter estimates. The sum of squared residuals
SSR is reported only where comparable with the baseline.
differences apply to the period 1967-1996, while the second differences refer to
1967-2006. How does the model discriminate between transitory insurable shocks
and measurement error? Equations (20)-(23) illustrate that if moments in first
(and second) differences were driven primarily by measurement error in hours,
then the correlation between hours and wage growth would be close to minus
one. A substantial amount of true transitory wage variation is needed to raise
this correlation to the level observed in the data. Finally, note that the variance
of biannual wage and hours growth (the bottom panels) is not much larger than
the variance of annual growth, which helps explain why the estimated variances
for permanent shocks are small relative to transitory shocks.
Alternative models: What goes wrong? To better understand why each
model element is needed to account for the observed cross-sectional moments, we
now discuss a range of experiments in which we shut down one model element
at a time, and reestimate the model. See Table 2 for the parameter estimates of
these alternative models.
We first consider two alternative insurance market structures. In the first, we as-
sume perfect insurance against permanent life-cycle shocks, by imposing vωt = 0.
In the second, we make the opposite assumption, namely that there is no explicit
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insurance against permanent life-cycle shocks, by imposing the restriction vηt = 0.
This economy captures the spirit of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), ac-
cording to which transitory shocks are largely insurable, while permanent shocks
are uninsurable.
The estimated “complete markets” model (vωt = 0) features almost twice as
large an average variance for permanent insurable shocks vη relative to the base-
line model. Absent changes in other parameter values, this would imply too
much dispersion in hours worked and too little dispersion in consumption: thus,
the estimation also delivers a larger estimate for σ (a lower Frisch) and a higher
estimate for vα0 (more uninsurable wage dispersion at labor market entry). How-
ever, absent permanent uninsurable shocks, the model has no way to generate the
observed rise in consumption dispersion over the life-cycle. Another indication
that this model exaggerates insurance against life-cycle shocks is that it generates
much too large an increase in the correlation between wages and hours over the
life-cycle.
The estimated PIH model (vηt = 0) delivers similar parameter estimates to the
baseline model, with the exception that the average variance of permanent unin-
surable shocks vω rises from 0.0056 to 0.0093. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimated
model replicates fairly closely the empirical life-cycle profile for the variance of log
consumption, because uninsurable wage shocks are partially smoothed via labor
supply and progressive taxation. However, the model now generates a counter-
factual decline over the life cycle in the correlation between wages and hours
worked. Recall that permanent uninsurable shocks drive this correlation down,
while permanent insurable shocks (shut off in this experiment) drive the correla-
tion up. Consequently, the estimated model also delivers a life-cycle increase in
the variance of earnings that is much too small.
We next experiment with shutting off flexible labor supply by setting σ =
∞ in the baseline model.42 With inelastic labor supply, measurement error is
the only source of variance in the growth of individual hours. However, with a
zero Frisch elasticity, measurement error in hours implies a negative correlation
between wages and hours worked, while this correlation is close to zero in the data.
The estimation compromises, delivering too little variation over time in individual
hours and a counterfactually negative wage-hours correlation. In addition, the
model with inelastic hours generates too much comovement between hours worked
and consumption because it rules out income effects as a force to offset preference
heterogeneity. We conclude that allowing for elastic labor supply is essential in
accounting for all moments involving hours worked.
In our last experiment, we eliminate preference heterogeneity by imposing vϕ̂t =
0. In our baseline model, preference heterogeneity is required to replicate the
positive empirical correlation between hours worked and consumption. Absent
42Technically, we set σ = 500. With σ large but finite, the model can still generate dispersion in hours
through preference heterogeneity. Given a Frisch elasticity near zero, our identification strategy for γ
(based on cross-sectional moments involving hours) fails. Thus we set γ equal to its value in the baseline
model.
VOL. 104 NO. X CONSUMPTION & LABOR SUPPLY WITH PARTIAL INSURANCE 31
preference variation, the model generates a counterfactual negative correlation
since, with γ > 1, individuals with a higher uninsurable wage component enjoy
more consumption but work fewer hours – see equations (5) and (6). Preference
heterogeneity also plays an important role in generating cross-sectional dispersion
in hours worked and consumption, and when it is shut down the estimation looks
for alternative ways to replicate these moments. In particular, it assigns larger
values for the variance of measurement error in consumption and delivers a higher
Frisch elasticity.
We conclude this section by highlighting two key messages from this exploration
of alternative models. First, the overall model fit worsens dramatically in each
restricted version of the baseline model we estimate (see the sum of squared
residuals in Table 2), indicating that each model element plays an important
quantitative role in accounting for observed dynamics of inequality. In particular,
the data – and especially the moments involving hours worked – speak strongly to
the existence of risk-sharing mechanisms that allow households to insure a fraction
(but only a fraction) of permanent idiosyncratic fluctuations in wages. They also
speak strongly to the existence of two fundamental drivers of dispersion in hours
worked: a positive elasticity in response to wage fluctuations and a second source
of dispersion in hours that is unrelated to wages.
Second, it is important to estimate the scope for risk sharing and preference
parameters jointly. The logic is simply that both matter for the dynamics of
consumption and labor supply. If we use more restricted models for risk sharing
(by imposing too much or too little insurance), the estimation contorts estimates
for preference elasticities or for preference heterogeneity in order to try to match
the same moments involving consumption and hours. If we restrict the model for
preferences (by imposing inelastic hours or an absence of preference heterogene-
ity), the model delivers the wrong estimate for the fraction of wage risk that is
insurable.
B. Insurance and inequality over the life cycle
We now turn to the first of our motivating questions: How effectively can
households smooth idiosyncratic wage fluctuations via insurance arrangements,
labor supply adjustments, and progressive taxation?
Pass-through coefficients There are three reasons for incomplete pass-through
from changes in wages to changes in consumption. First, shocks to wages that are
insurable will not be reflected in changes in consumption. Second, labor supply
decisions determine how uninsurable wage shocks transmit to earnings. Third,
the progressive tax system dampens the response of consumption to fluctuations
in earnings.
Let φw,ct denote the pass-through coefficient from wages to consumption, defined
as the OLS coefficient from a panel regression of model-simulated changes in log
consumption between t−1 and t on permanent (uninsurable or insurable) changes
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in log individual wages.43 We focus here on permanent shocks, because transitory
shocks are fully insurable in our framework. The elasticity of consumption with
respect to an uninsurable permanent innovation ωt is (1 + σ̂) / (σ̂ + γ)·(1− τ) (see
eq. 5), while consumption does not respond to permanent insurable innovations
ηt. Thus φ
w,c
t is given by
φw,ct︸︷︷︸
0.386
=
vωt
vωt + vηt︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.560
·
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.845
· (1− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.815
.
Plugging in the estimated values for γ, σ, vω, and vη from Table 1 along with
τ = 0.185 gives an average pass-through coefficient of φ¯w,c = 0.386. Thus, on
average, less than 40 percent of permanent wage shocks transmit to consumption.
The roles of explicit insurance, labor supply, and progressive taxation in deliv-
ering consumption smoothing against permanent wage fluctuations are captured,
respectively, by the three terms in the expression for φw,ct . Evaluated at the
sample-average parameter estimates, 44 percent of permanent wage shocks are
explicitly insured. Recall that we have remained agnostic on the sources of this
insurance: state-contingent private or public transfers, spousal labor supply, and
perfect smoothing of forecastable wage changes are among the most plausible can-
didates. Of the noninsured component of wages, 15.5 percent of fluctuations are
smoothed through individual labor supply, reflecting the fact that our estimate
for γ is larger than one (see eq. 6). Of the component transmitted to earnings,
18.5 percent of fluctuations are smoothed through progressive taxation. We con-
clude that all three channels play important roles in mediating the response of
consumption to permanent wage shocks. Explicit insurance is the most important
of these channels, followed by progressive taxation.44
While the primitive shocks in our model are shocks to wages, we can also com-
pute a pass-through coefficient from pretax individual earnings to consumption:
φy,ct =
vωt
vωt +
(
σˆ+γ
σˆ
)2
vηt
· (1− τ)
which implies an average value of φ¯y,c = 0.272. Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston
(2008, Table 7) estimate a quantitatively similar pass-through coefficient of 0.225
from permanent shocks to male earnings to nondurable consumption on US data.
43According to the model of the household described in Section II.A, the household composition
dummy D(g, k) drops out when looking at the growth rate of log consumption. This implies that φw,ct
can be interpreted either as measuring pass-through to raw household consumption, or as pass-through
to equivalized consumption.
44An alternative way to gauge the roles of these different smoothing mechanisms is to shut them off one
at a time, and then compute by how much the implied pass-through coefficient would increase, holding
constant other parameter values. We implement this by setting, respectively, vη = 0, σ →∞, and τ = 0,
in which cases φ¯w,c rises from 0.39 to, respectively, 0.69, 0.46, and 0.47. In this second calculation, the
ranking of smoothing channels is thus the same as in the first one.
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They conclude that the bulk of permanent individual income risk is insurable.
Our framework suggests that one has to be cautious with this interpretation, for
two reasons. First, earnings are endogenous in the model, and the pass-through
from the primitive wage shocks to consumption is 42 percent larger than the one
for earnings. Second, because labor supply adjustments tend to amplify insurable
wage shocks and dampen uninsurable wage shocks, pass-through from earnings to
consumption can be low even if the underlying shocks are mostly uninsurable in
nature. To see this, consider the extreme case in which preferences are linear in
hours worked (σ = 0) and taxation is linear (τ = 0). The pass-through coefficient
from earnings to consumption φy,ct would mistakenly suggest perfect risk-sharing,
i.e., limσ→0 φ
y,c
t = 0, irrespective of the size of vωt and vηt, whereas φ
w,c
t would
correctly indicate some degree of transmission of wage shocks to consumption.45
Growth in life-cycle variances An alternative, and more common, metric
for quantifying the extent of smoothing against life-cycle income fluctuations is
to compare the within-cohort life-cycle growth in the variances of consumption on
the one hand, and wages or earnings on the other (see, e.g., Blundell and Preston
1998; Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron 2004a; Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron 2011).
The analytical expressions for these moments are in equations (16) and (19).
Our framework uncovers a useful relationship between (i) the ratio of life-cycle
growth in the variance of consumption to growth in the variance of wages, and
(ii) the pass-through coefficient described above. Assuming ∆vθt = 0, we obtain
∆varat (log cˆ)
∆varat (log wˆ)
= (1− τ)2
(
1 + σˆ
σˆ + γ
)2 vωt
vωt + vηt
= (1− τ)
(
1 + σˆ
σˆ + γ
)
· φω,ct .
This relation reveals that these two alternative measures of risk sharing coincide
exactly if and only if progressive taxation and labor supply are both absent as
smoothing mechanisms, i.e., when either (i) τ = 0 and σ →∞, or (ii) τ = 0 and
γ = 1. In the latter case, even though labor supply is elastic, it is not used to
smooth uninsurable shocks to wages.
If τ > 0 or if γ > 1 (and σ < ∞), then smoothing provided through taxation
and/or labor supply shows up more strongly in the ratio ∆varat (log cˆ) /∆var
a
t (log wˆ)
than in the pass-through coefficient φω,ct . At our baseline parameter values, the
life-cycle increase in the variance of log consumption is only 25 percent of the cor-
responding increase in the variance of log wages, even though around 40 percent
of permanent wage shocks transmit to consumption.
45We can also define a pass-through coefficient from permanent wage changes to pretax earnings:
φw,yt =
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
·
vωt
vωt + vηt
+
1 + σ̂
σ̂
·
vηt
vωt + vηt
.
In our model, φw,ct = φ
w,y
t · φ
y,c
t if and only if either (i) vηt = 0, (ii) γ = 0, or (iii) σ →∞.
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C. Insurance and inequality over time
Insurability over time Table E1 in the Online Appendix contains the com-
plete set of year-by-year estimates for all the time-varying parameters of the
model. Figure 3 summarizes what these estimates imply for changes over time
in the structure of relative wages. Panel A shows that the variance of the total
uninsurable component (αt) declines slightly in the 1970s and then rises in the
remainder of the sample period. This pattern broadly accords with the fall of the
skill premium in the late 1960s to mid-1970s, and the subsequent increase in the
1980s and beyond. Under this interpretation, “skill-biased demand shifts” repre-
sent an important source of uninsurable wage shocks.46 The total cross-sectional
variance of the permanent insurable component of wages (κt) is generally increas-
ing throughout the first two decades, but declines somewhat in the 1990s (Panel
B). The variance of transitory insurable shocks (θt) plotted in Panel C grows
steadily throughout the sample, consistent with Moffitt and Gottschalk’s (2002)
estimates for earnings dynamics.47
[FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Combining these estimates allows us to address the second of our motivating
questions: What fraction of the observed rise in wage dispersion over our sample
period was insurable for US households? Panel D of Figure 3 indicates that in the
late 1960s the insurable component of wages accounted for around one-third of
the cross-sectional variance of log wages, while by the early 1980s this fraction was
around 50 percent. Since then, the variances of the two components of wages have
risen at a similar rate, leaving the fraction of wage fluctuations insured relatively
stable.
Finally, note that the “cohort” components in Panels A, B, and D are rather
steady over time, indicating that the bulk of the dynamics in cross-sectional wage
dispersion reflect changes in the variances of life-cycle shocks and not cohort
effects.
Time series fit The variance of log male wages increases by around 15 log
points over the sample period, with especially rapid growth in the 1980s. How do
the moments involving consumption and hours account for the partition of this
increase, described in Figure 3, between insurable and uninsurable risk? Figure
4 plots the evolution over time of these moments, alongside the corresponding
values for the estimated model.
46This interpretation is consistent with Orazio Attanasio and Steven J. Davis (1996) and with Jonathan
Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten and Giovanni L. Violante (2010b), who, in the context of an augmented
version of the standard incomplete-markets model, show that skill-biased demand shifts are the main
driver of the rise in consumption inequality.
47Around 1992-1993, this variance displays a spike. This estimated higher volatility may be linked to
the fact that survey year 1993 was the first year of computer-assisted telephone interviewing in the PSID.
In the previous version of the paper, we allowed for a temporary increase in measurement error in 1992.
Except for a slightly smaller variance of the transitory shock in 1992, this extension was inconsequential
for the rest of the estimation, and hence in the current version we have omitted it.
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[FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
Over the first half of the sample, we see a sharp rise in the wage-hours correla-
tion (Panel D). The model interprets this as indicating a rise in the variance of
the insurable wage component and a fall in the variance of the uninsurable com-
ponent. The latter translates into a theoretical prediction of modestly declining
consumption inequality before 1980, when our CEX sample begins. This pattern
for consumption inequality parallels the dynamics of the skill premium over the
period.48
After 1980 consumption data are available and further inform the estimation.
The variance of log consumption grows by only about 5 log points between 1980
and 2006, in line with earlier estimates by Dirk Krueger and Fabrizio Perri (2006).
This rise, paired with the one in the wage-consumption correlation, calls for an
increase in uninsurable wage dispersion and a slowdown in the rise of insurable
wage dispersion. This pattern is also consistent with the end of growth in the em-
pirical wage-hours correlation. The increase in the variance of consumption over
time is small relative to the increase in uninsurable wage dispersion (see Figure 3)
because, as with the life-cycle dimension, labor supply and progressive taxation
mitigate the impact of uninsurable wage dispersion on consumption dispersion.
Larger uninsurable wage shocks tend to drive the consumption-hours correlation
down over time. To offset this force and replicate the roughly flat pattern for the
correlation in the data, the estimation calls for a modest increase over time in
preference dispersion (see Table E1 in the Online Appendix).
Figure 5 shows the time series plots for moments in first and second differences.
Recall that these moments are driven primarily by measurement error and tran-
sitory wage shocks, given the relatively small estimated variances for the innova-
tions to permanent shocks. Thus we can point to the rise in the variance of wage
growth over time as the source of the corresponding rise in the estimated vari-
ance of transitory shocks (Panel C of Figure 3). These larger transitory shocks,
in turn, account for the model-predicted increase in the correlation between wage
and hours growth.
[FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
D. Inequality decomposition
We now turn to the third motivating question of our paper. Is observed cross-
sectional inequality primarily the result of life-cycle shocks, initial heterogeneity
in productivity and preferences, or simply measurement error? Given parameter
48It is also broadly consistent with evidence from Slesnick (2001, chapter 6), who, notwithstanding data
comparability issues, uses CEX data pre-1980 in order to construct a longer series for US consumption
dispersion. Guvenen and Smith (2010, Figure A.1) impute nondurable consumption into the PSID from
the CEX going back to 1967 and also uncover a decline in the variance of log consumption over the first
decade of their sample.
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Table 3—Decomposition of Cross-Sectional Inequality
Total
Variance
Percent Contribution to Total Variance
Initial Heterogeneity Life-Cycle Shocks Measure-
Pref- Unin- In- Unin- In- ment
erences surable surable surable surable Error
var(log wˆ) 0.351 0.0 31.5 10.0 17.1 31.3 10.1
var(log hˆ) 0.107 48.9 2.2 3.2 1.2 9.8 34.7
var(log yˆ) 0.432 11.7 22.8 12.5 10.4 43.7 0.0
var(log cˆ) 0.159 20.0 32.6 0.0 17.8 0.0 29.6
estimates and the moment expressions in eqs. (10)-(15), variance decompositions
are unique and easy to compute.
Cross-sectional average In Table 3, we report the average contribution of
each component across the entire 1967–2006 period.49
Interestingly, initial heterogeneity explains between 40 percent and 50 percent
of the observed variance for all variables. However, the source of this inequality
at labor market entry varies. Preference heterogeneity is dominant in accounting
for dispersion in hours worked, whereas heterogeneity in productivity (mostly
uninsurable) is paramount for wages, earnings, and consumption. Measurement
error also plays a large role, accounting for one-third of the observed variance for
both hours and consumption. The flip side of the finding that initial heterogeneity
and measurement error account for a large share of dispersion in consumption
and hours worked is that life-cycle shocks to wages contribute relatively little to
dispersion in these variables. Instead, life-cycle shocks explain half of the cross-
sectional variation in wages and earnings.
We conclude that there is no simple answer to the question: What determines
measured cross-sectional inequality among households? The answer depends on
the variable of interest: for hours it is mostly preference heterogeneity and mea-
surement error; for wages and earnings it is dispersion in productivity, predomi-
nantly over the life cycle; whereas for consumption it is a mix of all these factors.
Lifetime earnings An alternative way to measure the relative roles of initial
conditions versus life-cycle shocks is in terms of their contributions to discounted
lifetime pretax earnings. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004a) conclude that
roughly half of the variance of lifetime earnings is attributable to variation in ini-
tial conditions. Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011, Table 5) estimate that het-
erogeneity in initial conditions accounts for 62 percent of the variance of lifetime
49These values are computed by taking survival-probability-weighted averages across within-age-group
values for dispersion at each date and then computing a simple average across the years in our sample.
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earnings.50 We have simulated a distribution for discounted lifetime earnings in
our model, making the following two assumptions: (1) earnings are discounted at
an annual rate of 4.2 percent over a 38-year working life (as in Huggett, Ventura,
and Yaron 2011), and (2) all wage innovations and initial conditions are log-
normally distributed. Our estimates imply that initial conditions (i.e., dispersion
in κ0, α0 and ϕ̂) account for 63 percent of the variance of lifetime earnings, which
is very similar to the Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron estimate.51
E. Estimation without consumption data
Section II documents that moments involving labor supply are informative
about risk sharing. Proposition 3 proves that the model is in fact identified with-
out any data on consumption. In this section, we exploit this identification result
and reestimate the model using only data on wages and hours from the PSID.52
One motivation for this exercise is that there is some debate about how much
consumption inequality has risen over time in the United States (e.g., Attanasio,
Battistin, and Ichimura 2007; Aguiar and Bils 2011). A second motivation is
that the literature on risk sharing to date focuses almost exclusively on moments
involving consumption, and we would like to know whether moments involving
labor supply tell a comparable story in terms of the fraction of idiosyncratic risk
that households can insure.
When we estimate the model without CEX data, we find that the estimations
with and without consumption data deliver very similar dynamics for the insura-
bility of wage risk. Panel A of Figure 6 shows that the insurable fraction of total
cross-sectional wage dispersion, as estimated without consumption data, is very
close to the corresponding fraction in the baseline when consumption moments
are used. Moreover, the estimated pass-through coefficient φ¯w,c is essentially
unchanged relative to the baseline case (0.41 compared to 0.39).
[FIGURE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
The main difference relative to the baseline estimates is that estimated pref-
erence heterogeneity is now much smaller (see column (6) in Table 2). Figure 6
shows that lower preference heterogeneity translates to predicted levels for the
variance of log consumption (Panel B) and the consumption-hours correlation
(Panel D) that are much too low relative to their empirical counterparts. We
conclude that it is consumption moments, and especially the positive covariance
between consumption and hours, that offer the strongest evidence of extensive
50In an important early contribution, Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimated this fraction to be 91
percent. However, their estimate is a loose upper bound because their model assumes i.i.d. wage shocks.
That assumption, made for computational reasons, is clearly counterfactual.
51Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2011) omit preference heterogeneity from their model, which we
estimate to be an important determinant of inequality. On the other hand, an important initial condition
in their model (but not ours) is idiosyncratic learning ability.
52The identification proof of Proposition 3 is up to an external estimate for measurement error in
earnings. We therefore impose the baseline estimate vµy = 0.
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preference heterogeneity. Because the model without consumption data estimates
a smaller role for preference heterogeneity, it calls for a higher Frisch elasticity
of labor supply (1/σ̂ is now 0.45) in order to replicate observed hours dispersion.
Although the model is estimated without consumption data, it replicates the dy-
namics of consumption moments remarkably well, subject to the caveat about
levels discussed above (see also Figures E1 and E2 in the Online Appendix).53
Taken together, these results indicate that moments involving labor supply and
moments involving consumption paint a very consistent picture with respect to
how much smoothing households achieve against idiosyncratic risk. This finding
is reassuring from the standpoint of theory and strengthens the case for using
labor supply moments in future studies of risk sharing – especially given the high
quality and long panel dimension of existing datasets that record hours worked.
We have conducted our analysis within a simple static model of labor supply
in which wages are exogenous. Although this is a natural starting point to ex-
plore how micro data on labor supply can inform the study of risk sharing, one
interesting direction for future work would be to consider dynamic models in
which current hours worked affect future wages. In a stripped-down version of
our framework, we have experimented with introducing learning by doing along
the lines of Imai and Keane (2004). In one parametric special case, insurable and
uninsurable shocks turn out to have exactly the same effects on labor supply and
consumption as in the benchmark specification. Thus, the identification of model
parameters, including the degree of insurance, remains valid. The only difference
relative to the benchmark model is that wages now have an endogenous compo-
nent. In particular, transitory insurable shocks have a permanent effect on wages
because working more hours today raises future productivity. This analysis sug-
gests that introducing learning by doing is one way to micro-found the existence
of permanent insurable shocks.54
F. Robustness and statistical fit
We now examine the robustness of our estimates with respect to (i) the statis-
tical model for the variances of the innovations η and ω, and (ii) the choice of the
weighting matrix used in estimation.
We begin by estimating a version of our model where vηt and vωt follow unre-
stricted time sequences instead of fourth-order polynomials of time. The results,
reported in column (2) of Table 4, show that parameter estimates are remarkably
similar across the two versions of the model. Figure E3 in the Online Appendix
compares the two time series for the variances. The polynomials capture the main
low-frequency dynamics of the two series while avoiding the abrupt fluctuations
from one year to the next and the many zero boundary values that are features
53We experimented with estimating the model without consumption data while imposing the baseline
estimates for γ, σ, and vϕ. In this case, the no-consumption-data model consumption moments are
virtually indistinguishable from those of the baseline model.
54More details of this extension are available upon request.
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Table 4—Parameter Estimates: Robustness on Baseline Model Estimates
Baseline (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ 2.165 2.139 2.029 2.443 1.981 2.077
γ 1.713 1.691 1.715 1.745 1.610 1.747
vµh 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.027 0.037 0.038
vµy 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
vµc 0.041 0.041 0.042 0.033 0.039 0.043
vϕ̂ 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.052 0.048 0.063
vα0 0.102 0.102 0.088 0.106 0.105 0.083
vω 0.0056 0.0057 0.0070 0.0056 0.0055 0.0064
vκ0 0.047 0.047 0.053 0.047 0.048 0.056
vη 0.0044 0.0044 0.0045 0.0051 0.0043 0.0056
vθ 0.043 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.042 0.045
1/σ̂ 0.347 0.351 0.368 0.310 0.376 0.364
p- value of
OID test 0.99 – – – – 0.99
The baseline estimates are reproduced from Table 1. Other columns: (2) unrestricted
sequences for vηt and vωt, (3) each moment weighted by its number of observations,
(4) each moment weighted by the inverse of the corresponding element on the diagonal
of the fourth moment matrix, (5) weighting scheme that realigns (absolute) values
of moments. Variables with bars (e.g., vθ) denote average estimates over the sample
period, (6) minimum distance estimation on collapsed set of moments. The OID
tests for the models in columns (1) and (6) have χ2 distributions with 11, 368 and
580 degrees of freedom, respectively.
of the unconstrained sequences.
The first alternative weighting scheme that we explore is one where, rather
than giving each moment equal weight, we weigh each moment by its number of
observations – a scheme that puts more weight on the PSID moments and on the
moments in levels. The second alternative is a weighting matrix with elements
given by the inverse of the diagonal of the fourth-moment matrix described in On-
line Appendix D.55 The third alternative weighting matrix divides every variance
at age/year (a, t) by its sample average value, and every covariance between pairs
of variables (x, y) at age/year (a, t) by the product of the sample average of the
standard deviations of x and y.56 This addresses a potential concern that under
our baseline weighting scheme (the identity matrix), moments whose values are
55The square roots of the elements in this matrix provide the standard errors of the corresponding
elements in the vector of empirical moments. Hence, this weighting matrix gives more emphasis to
moments measured more precisely. As discussed in Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), this method
avoids the pitfalls of using the full optimal weighting matrix described by Altonji and Segal (1996), which
are primarily related to the terms outside the main diagonal.
56Effectively, we match correlations instead of covariances. Dividing the covariances at (a, t) by their
sample average is not feasible because some of them are too close to zero.
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large on average (e.g., the variance of log wages) will receive more weight than mo-
ments whose values are closer to zero on average (e.g., the variance of changes in
log hours), since the estimation algorithm minimizes the sum of squared residuals
between empirical and theoretical moments.
Estimation results under these three alternative schemes are reported in columns
(3)-(5) of Table 4. Point estimates are always within two standard deviations of
the benchmark and often much closer. Also the time paths of all the variances
are very similar to those of the baseline model.
The last row of Table 4 presents a test of the overidentifying restrictions (OID),
a χ2 statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the number of moments in excess
of the number of parameters. When the test is performed on the baseline set
of moments (and hence, with 11,368 degrees of freedom), the p-value is near 1,
indicating that the structural model cannot be rejected. In the context of dynamic
panel data models, Clive Bowsher (2002) reports severe loss of power of OID tests
when the number of overidentifying restrictions is large relative to the number
of observations used to calculate each moment.57 To strengthen test power, one
has to reduce the number of restrictions. We therefore collapse our full set of
age/year moments into unconditional moments by age and by year.58 When the
model is reestimated on this smaller set of moments, we achieve very similar point
estimates for all parameters (column (6) of Table 4). More important, the OID
test performed on this subset of restrictions still returns a large p-value, above
0.99. This result suggests that the model cannot be rejected and fits the data
quite well in a purely statistical sense. Online Appendix D contains a detailed
description of how we compute the test statistics.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a novel theoretical framework to analyze con-
sumption and labor supply in the presence of idiosyncratic labor income shocks. A
distinguishing feature of the model is that it can be solved analytically. Tractabil-
ity is achieved by extending the environment of Constantinides and Duffie (1996)
to incorporate flexible labor supply, partially insurable wage risk, progressive tax-
ation, and heterogeneity in the taste for leisure. From the closed-form equilibrium
allocations, it is straightforward to derive expressions for the cross-sectional (co-)
variances of wages, hours, and consumption. These expressions allow, in turn, a
formal identification proof and facilitate the estimation of the structural param-
eters. We used this framework (i) to measure the extent to which US households
57Monte Carlo simulations in Bowsher (2002) show that inference becomes misleading as soon as the
number of overidentifying restrictions approaches the number of observations. In our case, the average
number of observations used in PSID is 285 and in CEX is 179.
58See David M Roodman (2009) for a discussion of this “collapsed instruments” technique and a list
of applications. After collapsing the moments, we end up with 580 overidentifying restrictions, and an
average number of observations per moment of 8,291 in PSID and 5,318 in CEX. Note that Roodman
(2009) also reports that unbiasedness of the estimates is not affected by this instrument proliferation; if
anything, estimates are slightly more precise.
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can insure against wage risk, (ii) to quantify how risk sharing has changed over
the past 40 years –a period of sharp widening in the wage distribution, and (iii)
to decompose the sources of cross-sectional inequality in wages, hours, and con-
sumption.
This paper takes a first step toward showing how labor supply can help identify
risk sharing, an exercise usually done with consumption data only. The framework
could be extended to incorporate a participation decision along the extensive
margin. For example, with a minimum requirement on hours worked per period,
equilibrium labor supply allocations would feature a threshold such that low wage
workers do not work. Combining evidence on both the extensive and intensive
margins would, in principle, bring even more information to bear on the nature
of risk and insurance. Future work should also study how labor supply data can
inform the study of risk sharing in dynamic models for labor supply, where current
hours affect future wages thanks to some form of human capital accumulation.
The theoretical framework can be extended to shed light on a range of macroe-
conomic questions where heterogeneity and risk are central to the analysis. In
Jonathan Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten and Giovanni L. Violante (2010a), we use
a version of the model to explore the optimal degree of progressivity in the tax
schedule, focusing on how the optimal degree of public redistribution varies with
the fraction of wage risk that can be insured privately, the desire for public goods,
and the elasticity of labor supply. In Jonathan Heathcote, Kjetil Storesletten and
Giovanni L. Violante (2013), we extend the model to incorporate an education
choice, and quantify the welfare effect of the observed increase in the college
premium, alongside the observed rise in wage risk within education groups. Fi-
nally, it is also possible to introduce aggregate shocks that are correlated with the
variance of idiosyncratic risk, as in Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Kjetil
Storesletten, Chris I. Telmer and Amir Yaron (2004b), and non-time-separable
Epstein-Zin preferences. Such an extended setup is a natural environment for
studying asset pricing and the welfare costs of business cycles.
Many of these issues have been extensively explored using conventional incomplete-
markets models and numerical solution methods. The reason to revisit them is
that our framework remains tractable when extended along these dimensions,
making the economic forces at play transparent and readily quantifiable.
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Figure 1. Data and model fit for moments in levels along the age dimension. These plots
are constructed by regressing observations for all (age a, year t) cells on a set of age and
cohort dummies. The plots show the estimated age coefficients. For the variances of wages
and hours and for the wage-hours correlation, we use the entire 1967-2006 sample period. For
the moments involving consumption, we use the 1980-2006 sample for which consumption data
are available. The same regression procedure for constructing the age-profiles is applied
to the data and to the model-generated moments. Dotted lines denote 90–10 bootstrapped
confidence intervals for the empirical moments.
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Figure 2. Data and model fit for moments in differences along the age dimension. Panels
in the upper row show first differences for the years 1967-1996. Panels in the lower row
show second differences for the years 1967-2006. These plots are constructed by taking
the average across time for each age group a: we do not control for cohort effects in
constructing these plots, because differencing already eliminates cohort effects from the
theoretical moments. Dotted lines denote 90–10 bootstrapped confidence intervals for the
empirical moments.
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Figure 3. Panel A plots the cross-sectional variance for the uninsurable component of wages
αt (series labeled “Total”) and the cross-sectional variance for the cohort-specific initial-
age uninsurable component α0t (series labeled “Cohort”). Panel B plots the corresponding
series for the insurable component: κt (series labeled “Total”) and κ0t (series labeled “Co-
hort”). Panel C plots vθt. In Panel D the “Total” line is the ratio of the sum of the “Total”
series in Panels B and C to the total cross-sectional variance of wages (the sum of the “To-
tal” series in Panels A, B and C). The “Cohort” line in Panel D is the ratio of the “Cohort”
series in Panel B to the sum of “Cohort” lines in Panels A and B.
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Figure 4. Data and model fit for moments in levels along the time dimension. These plots
are constructed by aggregating across age groups within a given year by weighting each
age group by its survival probability to account for mortality. We use the same weights in
both model and data. Dotted lines denote 90–10 bootstrapped confidence intervals for the
empirical moments.
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Figure 5. Data and model fit for moments in differences along the time dimension. Panels in
the upper row show first differences for the years 1967-1996. Panels in the lower row show
second differences for the years 1967-2006. These plots are constructed by aggregating
across age groups within a given year by weighting each age group by its survival probability
to account for mortality. We use the same weights in both model and data. Dotted lines
denote 90–10 bootstrapped confidence intervals for the empirical moments.
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Figure 6. Data, baseline model estimated on the PSID and the CEX, and model estimated
without CEX data (labeled “No CEX”). Plots in Panel A are constructed in the same way
as the line labeled “Total”in Panel A of Figure 3, and plots in Panels B-D as in Figure 4.
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Mathematical Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is in two parts. In the first we describe a planner’s problem and
show that the solution to this problem is the allocation of consumption and hours
described in Proposition 1, part (ii). In the second, we decentralize these allo-
cations in a competitive equilibrium and show that the asset prices described in
Proposition 1, part (iii), and the no-inter-island-trade result described in part (i)
form part of this decentralization. In what follows, we omit some technical details
the proof. See Online Appendix A for a complete derivation.
Planner’s allocations: We first solve for equilibrium allocations for consump-
tion and hours worked by solving a set of static planning problems. Each island-
level planner maximizes equally weighted period utility for a set of agents that
share a common age a, a common preference weight ϕ, and a common wage
component αt. Let xt = (a, ϕ, αt) denote these island-level components of the
individual state. Each island-level planner controls a set of agents with the age-
specific population distributions for the wage components F aκ,t and Fθ,t. Let F
a
ε,t
denote the implied age-specific distribution over κt + θt. The planner’s problem
on an island defined by xt is to choose functions ct(xt, εt), ht(xt, εt) to solve
max
{ct(xt,·),ht(xt,·)}
∫ [
ct(xt, εt)
1−γ − 1
1− γ
− exp (ϕ)
ht(xt, εt)
1+σ
1 + σ
]
dF aε,t
subject to the island-level resource constraint
(A1)
∫ [
λ (exp (αt + εt)ht(xt, εt))
1−τ − ct(xt, εt)
]
dF aε,t = 0.
Combine the first-order conditions with respect to ct and ht to get
(A2) ht(xt, εt) =
[
(1− τ)λct(xt, εt)
−γ exp ((αt + εt)(1 − τ)− 1− ϕ)
] 1
σ+τ .
Substituting (A2) into (A1), using the definition for the tax-modified Frisch elas-
ticity σ̂ = (σ + τ)/(1 − τ), and rearranging yields the expressions for ct and ht
in eq. (5)-(6), where C˜at and H˜
a
t are constants common to all agents of age a in
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year t given by
C˜at =
1
σ̂ + γ
((1 + σ̂) log λ+ log(1− τ)) + M˜at
H˜at ≡
1
(1− τ) (σ̂ + γ)
((1− γ) log λ+ log(1− τ))−
γ
σ̂(1− τ)
M˜at
M˜at =
σ̂
σ̂ + γ
log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)(1 + σ̂)
σ̂
εt
)
dF aε,t.
Decentralization (prices): To decentralize the solution to the above plan-
ner’s problem, we start by conjecturing prices in this equilibrium. Pretax wages
equal individual labor productivity, w(xt, εt) = exp(αt + εt). At this wage, the
intratemporal first-order condition from the agent’s problem described in Section
I.A is identical to the intratemporal first order condition for the planner described
in eq. (A2). Thus at competitive wages and the conjectured allocations (eqs. 5
and 6), agents are optimizing on the intratemporal margin. At first blush this
might seem surprising, given the presence of progressive earnings taxation in the
economy. Recall, however, that individual agents (in the competitive equilibrium)
and island-level planners (in the problem described above) are both atomistic and
take the tax/transfer system parameters as exogenous.
To conjecture equilibrium prices for intertemporal insurance claims, it is con-
venient to revert to history-dependent notation and write ct(s
t) rather than
ct(xt, εt). We begin with the price of within-island insurance Qt
(
S; st
)
. The
intertemporal first-order condition from the agent’s problem (Section I.A) defines
the price at which an agent of age a with history st is willing, on the margin, to
buy or sell a set of insurance contracts Bt(S; s
t) that pay δ−1 units of consumption
if and only if st+1 = (ωt+1, ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ S ⊆ S. This price is simply the average
marginal rate of substitution in those states. Substituting in the expression for
consumption (5) yields the expression for Qt
(
S; st
)
in eq. (7) of Proposition 1.
Thus the prices Qt(S; s
t) are consistent with optimization on the consumer side.
Note that Qt
(
S; st
)
= Qt(S): insurance prices are independent of the individ-
ual history st and age a. From eq. (7) there are two pieces to this result. First,
Fs,t+1, the joint distribution over st+1 = (ωt+1, ηt+1, θt+1) at t+1, is independent
of st and thus the second term in eq. (7) is independent of st. Second, insurance
prices are also independent of age a, because the growth in average consump-
tion exp
(
C˜a+1t+1 − C˜
a
t
)
is independent of age, reflecting the permanent-transitory
model for individual productivity dynamics. Note also that due to full insurance
against (ηt+1, θt+1), the price of insurance against ηt+1 and θt+1 simply reflects
probabilities, while the price of insurance against ωt+1 also reflects the conditional
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marginal rate of substitution, with insurance against low ωt+1 realizations being
more expensive than equally likely high ωt+1 realizations.
We now turn to the price function for insurance claims traded across islands.
Because any contract that can be traded between islands can also be traded within
an island, the inter-island price for a claim that pays δ−1 units of consumption
if and only if st+1 ∈ Z must, by arbitrage, equal the corresponding within-island
price, for any Z. This implies Q∗t
(
Z; st
)
= Pr ((ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z) × Q
∗
t (S) =
Q∗t (Z), where Qt (S) is the price of insurance against all states (i.e., a risk-free
bond). Thus these prices are just probabilities times Qt (S).
Decentralization (asset purchases): We now derive asset purchases, Bt(st+1; s
t)
and B∗t (ηt+1, θt+1; s
t) and verify that agents’ budget constraints are satisfied in
equilibrium.
Given that any available inter-island insurance contract can be purchased at the
same price on the within-island market, B∗t (ηt+1, θt+1; s
t) = 0 for all (ηt+1, θt+1)
is consistent with individual optimization (Proposition 1, part (iii)). Thus, agents
are optimizing by purchasing all their insurance on the island on which they are
located. At the same time, becauseQ∗t
(
Z; st
)
= Q∗t (Z), no agent has an incentive
to try to sell insurance to an agent located on another island. To understand this,
note that the price at which one agent (say agent i1) with history s
t
i1
is willing to
buy, on the margin, a set of claims that pay if and only if (ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z is the
probability of that event times agent i1’s expected marginal rate of substitution,
i.e., Pr ((ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z) × Qt
(
S; sti1
)
. The price at which a second agent on a
different island (agent i2 with history s
t
i2
) is willing to sell this insurance to agent
i1 is the same probability times agent i2’s expected marginal rate of substitution,
Pr ((ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z) × Qt
(
S; sti2
)
. If agents i1 and i2 did not share the same
marginal rate of substitution (i.e., if Qt
(
S; sti1
)
6= Qt
(
S; sti2
)
), then there could
be no equilibrium without inter-island trade, because any such equilibrium would
feature unexploited gains from trade. Thus, Qt(S, s
t) = Qt(S) is the crucial result
supporting an absence of inter-island trade.
Finally, we now derive an expression for purchases of state-contingent claims,
Bt(st+1; s
t), and verify budget balance. Given B∗t (Z; s
t) = 0 ∀Z,∀st, realized
wealth at st implicitly defines insurance purchases Bt−1(st; s
t−1) = δdt(s
t). Since
insurance payouts must deliver the discounted present value of lifetime differences
between consumption and after-tax earnings, the realized wealth must be
dt(s
t) = Tt
(
st
)
+ Est
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+j(s
t+j)−γ
ct(st)−γ
Tt+j
(
st+j
) ,
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where Tt+j
(
st+j
)
≡ ct+j
(
st+j
)
−λ
(
w
(
st+j
)
ht+j
(
st+j
))1−τ
is the net transfer in
period t+ j.
Given this guess for dt(s
t), it is straightforward to verify that the agent’s budget
constraint is satisfied (see Online Appendix A for a complete derivation).
B. The household model of Section II
Full insurance against (g, k): Assume that utility for individual i in a household
of g adult workers and k children is
u(c, hi, g, k) =
1
1− γ
(
c
e(g, k)
)1−γ
−
exp (ϕ)
1 + σ
h1+σi ,
where c is household consumption and hi is agent i’s hours worked. The household
attaches equal weights to all adults and no weight to the children.
As in Appendix A, let xt = (a, ϕ, αt) denote the island-level components of
the individual state. The planner can insure against realizations of εt, g, and k.
The planner’s problem is to choose functions ct(xt, g, k) and hit(xt, εt, g, k) for
i = 1, ..., g to solve
(A1)
max
{ct,hit}
∫ [
g
1− γ
(
ct(xt, g, k)
e (g, k)
)1−γ
−
g∑
i=1
∫
exp (ϕ)
1 + σ
hit(xt, εt, g, k)
1+σ dF aεt
]
dFt (g, k) ,
subject to the island-level after-tax resource constraint
(A2)∫ [
ct(xt, g, k) −
g∑
i=1
∫
λ [exp (αt + εt) hit (xt, εt, g, k)]
1−τ dF aεt
]
dFt (g, k) = 0,
where eqs. (A1)-(A2) incorporate the within-island distribution Ft (g, k) of house-
hold workers and children, and where, based on the result in Appendix A, we have
already let consumption be independent of εt.
The first-order condition w.r.t. ct implies that consumption for a (g, k) house-
hold is
(A3) ct (xt, g, k) = ct (xt, 1, 0)
(
g
e (g, k)1−γ
)1/γ
.
Combine the first-order conditions w.r.t. ct and hit with eqs. (A2)-(A3) to de-
rive an expression for ct (xt, 1, 0). DefineD (g, k) ≡ (log g) /γ−(1− γ) /γ log(e(g, k)).
Then use eq. (A3) and the definitions for σ̂ and ϕ̂ to derive the equilibrium allo-
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cations for household consumption and individual hours,
log ct (xt, g, k) = D (g, k)− (1− τ) ϕ̂+ (1− τ)
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)
αt + C˜
a
t
log hit (xt, εt, g, k) = −ϕ̂+
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
αt +
1
σ̂
εit + H˜
a
t ,
where expressions for C˜at and H˜
a
t are in Online Appendix B1. Note that hours
do not depend on (g, k).
No insurance against (g, k): Consider now the model without insurance against
household type. In this model, there is no within-island variation in household
composition (g, k). Thus the island-level components of the individual state are
xt = (a, ϕ, αt, g, k), and the island planner problem corresponding to the com-
petitive equilibrium is to choose a number ct(xt) and functions hit(xt, εt) for
i = 1, ..., g to solve
max
ct(xt),{hit(xt,·)}
{
g
1− γ
(
ct(xt)
e (g, k)
)1−γ
−
g∑
i=1
∫
exp (ϕ)
1 + σ
hit(xt, εt)
1+σ dF aεt
}
s.t. ct(xt)−
g∑
i=1
∫
λ [exp (αt + εit)hit (xt, εt)]
1−τ dF aεt = 0.
In Online Appendix B2 we derive the following allocations:
log ct(xt) = D
c (g, k) − (1− τ) ϕ̂+ (1− τ)
(
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
)
αt + C˜
a
t
log hit(xt, εt) = D
h (g, k) − ϕ̂+
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
αt +
κit + θit
σ̂
+ H˜at ,
where the equivalization dummies areDc (g, k) = ((1+σ̂) log g−(1−γ) log e(g, k))/(σ̂+
γ) and Dh (g, k) = (Dc (g, k)− log g) /(1− τ).
C. Proofs of Identification
C1. Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is organized in four recursive steps.
Step A. The four (sets of) parameters σ̂, γ, {vηt +∆vθt}
T
t=2 , {vωt}
T
t=2 are
identified from within-cohort changes in the macro moments, ∆varat (log wˆ) ,
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∆varat (log hˆ),∆var
a
t (log cˆ), and ∆cov
a
t (log wˆ, log cˆ), all available from t = 2, ..., T .
These parameters are identified recursively as follows. Each element of the se-
quence {vωt}
T
t=2 is identified by:
∆covat (log wˆ, log cˆ)
2 /∆varat (log cˆ) = vωt.
Given vωt , each element of the sequence {vηt +∆vθt}
T
t=2 is identified by
∆varat (log wˆ) = vωt + (vηt +∆vθt) .
Given vωt and vηt +∆vθt, the tax-modified Frisch elasticity σ̂ is identified by
∆varat (log hˆ) = [∆cov
a
t (log hˆ, log cˆ)/∆cov
a
t (log wˆ, log cˆ)]
2vωt + 1/σ̂
2 (vηt +∆vθt) .
Given σ̂, the parameter γ is identified by
∆covat (log hˆ, log cˆ)/∆cov
a
t (log wˆ, log cˆ) = (1− γ) / (σ̂ + γ) .
Step B. Since σ̂ is known, the variances of transitory insurable shocks {vθt}
T−1
t=1
are identified from the difference between the dispersion in growth rates (“micro
moments”) and the growth rate of within-cohort dispersion (“macro moments”)
available from t = 2, ..., T :
covat (∆ log wˆ,∆ log hˆ)+var
a
t (∆ log hˆ)−∆cov
a
t (log wˆ, log hˆ)−∆var
a
t (log hˆ) =
2(1 + σ̂)
σ̂2
vθ,t−1.
Combining the sequence {vθt}
T−1
t=1 with {vηt +∆vθt}
T
t=2 identifies {vηt}
T−1
t=2 . Sub-
stituting the value for vθ,T−1 into (vηT +∆vθT ) from Step A identifies (vηT + vθT ).
Step C. Since σ̂ and γ are known, the following moments, available for all
t = 1, ..., T and evaluated for the youngest age group, identify the cohort effects
sequence
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t
}T
t=1
:
cov0t (log wˆ, log cˆ) = (1− τ) (1 + σ̂) / (σ̂ + γ) vα0t
cov0t (log hˆ, log cˆ) = (1− τ) vϕ̂t + (1− τ) (1 + σ̂) (1− γ) / (σ̂ + γ)
2 vα0t.
Then {vκ0t}
T−1
t=1 and (vκ0T + vθT ) are identified from
cov0t (log wˆ, log hˆ) + var
0
t (log hˆ) = vϕ̂t +
(1− γ)(1 + σ̂)
(σ̂ + γ)2
vα0t +
1 + σ̂
σ̂2
(vκ0t + vθt).
Step D. Finally, the variances of measurement error {vµy, vµh, vµc} are identi-
fied from the following moments in levels, for example those corresponding to the
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youngest age group:
cov0t (log wˆ, log hˆ) = (1− γ) / (σ̂ + γ) vα0t + 1/σ̂ (vκ0t + vθt)− vµh
var0t (log wˆ) = vα0t + (vκ0t + vθt) + vµy + vµh
var0t (log cˆ) = (1− τ)
2 vϕ̂t + (1− τ)
2 (1 + σ̂)2 / (σ̂ + γ)2 vα0t + vµc.
C2. Proof of Corollary 2.1
At dates t = tˆ, tˆ+ 1, the data availability is the same as in Proposition 2, and
hence one can identify vµy. Applying Proposition 3 to dates other than (tˆ, tˆ+ 1)
when only wage and hours data are available, the whole model is then identified.
C3. Proof of Corollary 2.2
From Proposition 2 we identify the parameters {σ̂, γ, vµh, vµy, vµc}, the se-
quences
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t
}tˆ
t=1
, {vκ0t, vθt}
tˆ−1
t=1, {vωt, vηt}
tˆ
t=2, and the sums vη,tˆ + vθ,tˆ and
vκ0tˆ + vθtˆ.
From the cross-sectional moment ∆varat (log cˆ) = (1− τ)
2 (1 + σ̂)2 / (σ̂ + γ)2 vωt,
which is available every year, we can identify {vωt}
T
t=tˆ+1. We identify the cohort
effects
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t
}T
t=tˆ+1
from the moments, available in every year,
cov0t (log wˆ, log cˆ) = (1− τ) (1 + σ̂) / (σ̂ + γ) vα0t
cov0t (log hˆ, log cˆ) = (1− τ) vϕ̂t + (1− τ) (1 + σ̂) (1− γ) / (σ̂ + γ)
2 vα0t.
By combining the moments
covat (∆
2 log wˆ,∆2 log hˆ) + varat (∆
2 log hˆ)−∆2covat (log wˆ, log hˆ)−∆
2varat (log hˆ)
= 2 (1 + σ̂) /σ̂2 vθ,t−2,
we identify {vθt} for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ + 2, tˆ + 4, ..., T − 2. Note that,
since vθ,tˆ is identified, so are vη,tˆ and vκ0tˆ. From ∆
2varat (log wˆ) = vωt + vω,t−1 +
(vηt + vη,t−1 + vθt − vθ,t−2), available for t = tˆ, tˆ + 2, ..., T , we can identify the
sum
{
vηt + vη,t−1 +∆
2vθt
}
. This, together with the sequence {vθ,t}, available
for t = tˆ, tˆ + 2, ..., T , allows us to identify {vηt + vη,t−1} for the biannual years
t = tˆ, tˆ+ 2, tˆ+ 4, ..., T − 2, as well as {vηT + vη,T−1 + vθT }. Finally, consider the
moment
var0t (log wˆ) = vα0t + (vκ0t + vθt) + vµy + vµh.
This moment is available for the biannual years and identifies {vκ0t} for t =
tˆ, tˆ+ 2, tˆ+ 4, ..., T − 2 and vκ0,T + vθT .
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C4. Proof of Corollary 2.3
Step A of Proposition 2 shows that T − 1 realizations of vωt are identified, and
hence one can uniquely identify all the coefficients of a time polynomial of order
T − 2 or lower and recover the entire time-series {vωt}
T
t=1 . From Step B of of
Proposition 2, T − 2 realizations of vηt are identified, and in the same vein one
can uniquely identify all the coefficients of a time polynomial of order T − 3 or
lower and recover the entire time-series {vηt}
T
t=1 . Then, from Step A and Step
B, it can be seen that the whole sequence {vθt}
T
t=1 is identified. As a result,
from Step C, one can identify the entire time-series {vκ0t}
T
t=1 . The rest of the
parameter vector is identified exactly as in Proposition 2.
D. Additional identifying assumptions
When we model vηt and vωt as time-polynomials, we make the following two
additional assumptions to complete identification in the missing PSID years:
1) For t = tˆ + 1, tˆ + 3, ..., T − 1, assume vκ0,t =
(
vκ0,t−1 + vκ0,t+1
)
/2. Given
this “smooth cohort effects” assumption, the moment
var1t (log wˆ)− var
0
t (log wˆ) =
(
vα0,t−1 + vωt
)
+
(
vκ0,t−1 + vηt
)
− vα0t − vκ0t
for t = tˆ+ 2, tˆ + 4, ..., T identifies the corresponding values for vη,t. Given
that {vη,t−1 + vηt} is already identified for these years from Corollary 2.2
and Assumption 1, the corresponding values for vη,t−1 are also identified.
2) For t = tˆ+ 1, tˆ+ 3, ..., T − 1, assume vθt = (vθ,t−1 + vθ,t+1) /2.
When we estimate the model where variances are allowed to vary freely year
by year, we make the following three additional identifying assumptions, beyond
1. and 2. above, to complete identification at endpoints:
3) Assume vκ0,T = vκ0,T−2.Given that
{
vκ0,T + vθ,T
}
and {vη,T−1 + vη,T + vθ,T }
are already identified from Corollary 2.2, this assumption identifies vθ,T and
{vη,T−1 + vη,T }.
4) Assume vω1 = vω2.
5) Assume vη1 = vη2.
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This Online Appendix is organized as follows. Section A contains an extended
proof of Proposition 1 (existence of no-trade competitive equilibrium and char-
acterization of equilibrium allocations, asset prices and asset purchases). Section
B develops in detail the two household models discussed in Section II.A of the
paper which provide a foundation for equivalizing the data. Section C contains
identification proofs for Proposition 3 (when consumption data are not available)
and an extension for the case where data are biannual. Section D describes the
construction of the overidentifying restriction test statistic.
A. Extended Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is in two parts. In the first part we describe a planner’s problem, and
show that the allocations for consumption and hours described in Proposition 1,
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part (ii) are the solution to this problem. In the second part, we decentralize these
allocations in a competitive equilibrium, and show that the asset prices described
in Proposition 1, part (iii) and the no-inter-island-trade result described in part
(i) form part of this decentralization.
Planner’s Problem (allocations): We first solve for equilibrium allocations
for consumption and hours worked by solving a set of static planning problems.
Each island-level planner maximizes equally weighted period utility for a set of
agents that share a common age a, a common preference weight ϕ, and a common
wage component αt. Let xt = (a, ϕ, αt) denote these island-level components of
the individual state. Each island-level planner controls a set of agents with the
age-specific population distributions F aκ,t and Fθ,t. Let F
a
ε,t denote the implied
age-specific distribution over εt = κt + θt. The planner’s problem on an island
defined by xt is to choose functions ct(xt, εt), ht(xt, εt) to solve
max
{ct(xt,·),ht(xt,·)}
∫ [
ct(xt, εt)
1−γ − 1
1− γ
− exp (ϕ)
ht(xt, εt)
1+σ
1 + σ
]
dF aε,t
subject to the island-level resource constraint∫ [
λ (exp (αt + εt)ht(xt, εt))
1−τ − ct(xt, εt)
]
dF aε,t = 0.
The first-order conditions with respect to ct(xt, εt) and ht(xt, εt) are, respec-
tively,
ct(xt, εt)
−γ = χt(xt),
exp (ϕ) ht(xt, εt)
σ = χt(xt)λ exp (αt(1− τ)) exp (εt(1− τ)) (1− τ)ht(xt, εt)
−τ ,
where χt(xt) is the multiplier on the date t resource constraint. Note that
ct(xt, εt) = χt(xt)
− 1
γ , and thus consumption does not depend on εt. Combin-
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ing the two FOCs gives
(A1)
ht(xt, εt) = ((1− τ)λ)
1
σ+τ ct(xt)
− γ
σ+τ exp
(
1− τ
σ + τ
(αt + εt)−
1
σ + τ
−
ϕ
σ + τ
)
.
Substituting (A1) into the resource constraint gives
ct(xt, εt) = λ((1− τ)λ)
1−τ
σ+τ exp (αt(1− τ)) ct(xt, εt)
−
γ(1−τ)
σ+τ exp
(
−
1− τ
σ + τ
)
× exp
(
−
ϕ(1− τ)
σ + τ
+ αt
(1− τ)2
σ + τ
)∫
exp ((1− τ)εt) exp
(
(1− τ)2
σ + τ
εt
)
dF aεt.
Taking logs and simplifying yields
log ct(xt, εt)
=
1 + σ
σ + τ + γ(1− τ)
log λ+
1− τ
σ + τ + γ(1− τ)
log(1− τ)−
1− τ
σ + τ + γ(1− τ)
ϕ
+
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ + γ (1− τ)
αt +
σ + τ
σ + τ + γ(1− τ)
log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)(1 + σ)
σ + τ
εt
)
dF aεt.
By using the definition for the tax-modified Frisch elasticity σ̂ = (σ+ τ)/(1− τ),
the above expression simplifies to:
(A2) log ct(xt, εt) = −
ϕ
σ̂ + γ
+
(1− τ) (1 + σ̂)
σ̂ + γ
αt + C˜
a
t
which is the expression in Proposition 1, part (ii), where C˜at is a constant common
to all agents of age a in year t given by
C˜at =
1
σ̂ + γ
((1 + σ̂) log λ+ log(1− τ)) + M˜at ,
M˜at =
σ̂
σ̂ + γ
log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)(1 + σ̂)
σ̂
εt
)
dF aε,t.
Note that if we were to assume, for example, that log εat ∼ N
(
−
vaεt
2 , v
a
εt
)
, then
we could solve out the integral in the expression for M˜at :
M˜at =
1
σ̂ + γ
(
(1− τ)(1 + σ̂)
σ̂
(1− τ (1 + σ̂))
vεt
2
)
.
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We now substitute the expression for log ct(xt, εt) in (A2) into (A1) to solve for
log ht(xt, εt) :
log ht(xt, εt) = −
1
(1− τ) (σ̂ + γ)
ϕ+
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
αt +
1
σ̂
εt + H˜
a
t
which is the expression in Proposition 1, part (ii), where
H˜at ≡
1
(1− τ) (σ̂ + γ)
((1− γ) log λ+ log(1− τ))−
γ
σ̂(1− τ)
M˜at .
Decentralization (prices): We now turn to the second part of the proof of
Proposition 1, namely the decentralization of the solution to the above planner’s
problem. We begin by conjecturing prices in this equilibrium. We set pretax
wages equal to individual labor productivity:
wt(xt, εt) = exp(αt + εt).
At this wage, the intratemporal FOC from the agent’s problem described in Sec-
tion I.A of the main text is identical to the intratemporal FOC for the planner
described in eq.(A1). Thus at competitive wages and the conjectured allocations
(eqs. 5 and 6) agents are optimizing on the intratemporal margin. At first blush
this might seem surprising, given the presence of progressive earnings taxation in
the economy. Recall, however, that individual agents (in the competitive equi-
librium) and island-level planners (in the problem described above) are atomistic
and hence both take the tax system parameters as exogenous.
We next conjecture equilibrium prices for intertemporal insurance claims. At
this point it is convenient to revert to history-dependent notation, so we will write
ct(s
t) rather than ct(xt, εt). We begin with the price of within-island insurance
Qt
(
S; st
)
. The intertemporal FOC from the agent’s problem (described in Section
I.A) defines the price at which an agent of age a with history st is willing, on the
margin, to buy or sell a set of insurance contracts Bt(S; s
t) that pay δ−1 units of
consumption if and only if st+1 = (ωt+1, ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ S ⊆ S. This price is simply
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the average marginal rate of substitution in those states:2
(A3) Qt
(
S; st
)
= βδδ−1
∫
S
ct+1(s
t, st+1)
−γ
ct(st)−γ
dFs,t+1.
Substituting in the expression for consumption (A2) we have
(A4)
Qt
(
S; st
)
= β exp
(
−γ
(
C˜a+1t+1 − C˜
a
t
))∫
S
exp
(
−γ(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
ωt+1
)
dFs,t+1,
which is the expression in Proposition 1, part (iii), where C˜at is defined above,
and
C˜a+1t+1 − C˜
a
t
=
σ̂
σ̂ + γ
[
log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)(1 + σ̂)
σ̂
εt+1
)
dF a+1ε,t+1 − log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)(1 + σ̂)
σ̂
εt
)
dF aε,t
]
=
σ̂
σ̂ + γ
log
∫ exp
(
(1−τ)(1+σ̂)
σ̂ ηt+1
)
dFη,t+1
∫
exp
(
(1−τ)(1+σ̂)
σ̂ θt+1
)
dFθ,t+1∫
exp
(
(1−τ)(1+σ̂)
σ̂ θt
)
dFθ,t

is independent of a. Thus the prices Qt(S; s
t) are consistent with optimization
on the consumer side.
Note that Qt
(
S; st
)
= Qt(S) : insurance prices are independent of the individ-
ual history st and age a. From eq. (A4) there are two pieces to this result. First,
Fs,t+1, the joint distribution over st+1 = (ωt+1, ηt+1, θt+1) at t+1, is independent
of st and thus the second term in eq. (A4) is independent of st. Second, insurance
prices are also independent of age a, because while average consumption C˜at is
age-dependent, growth in average consumption C˜a+1t+1 − C˜
a
t is independent of age,
reflecting the permanent-transitory model for individual productivity dynamics.
Note also that the price of insurance against ηt+1 and θt+1 simply reflects prob-
abilities, while the price of insurance against ωt+1 also reflects the conditional
marginal rate of substitution, with insurance against low ωt+1 realizations being
2Note that the agent effectively discounts at rate βδ, while mortality insurance ensures payment of
δ−1 units of consumption in the event that the agent survives to the next period and st+1 ∈ S.
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more expensive than equally likely high ωt+1 realizations. This asymmetry re-
flects the fact that ηt+1 and θt+1 are perfectly insured in equilibrium, while ωt+1
remains uninsured. The price of a risk-free bond Qt (S) is
Qt
(
S; st
)
= β exp
(
−γ
(
C˜a+1t+1 − C˜
a
t
)) ∫
S
exp
(
−γ(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
ωt+1
)
dFs,t+1 = Qt (S) .
We now turn to the price function for insurance claims traded across islands.
Because any contract that can be traded between islands can also be traded within
an island, the inter-island price for a claim that pays δ−1 units of consumption
if and only if st+1 ∈ Z must, by arbitrage, equal the corresponding within-island
price, for any Z. This implies
Q∗t
(
Z; st
)
= Pr ((ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z)×Qt(S) = Q
∗
t (Z) .
Thus these prices are just probabilities times the price of a risk-free bond.3
Assuming log-normal distributions for ωt+1, ηt+1 and θt+1 allows us to solve
out the integral in the expression for the risk-free rate Qt(S). In this case,
C˜a+1t+1 − C˜
a
t =
(1− τ)(1 + σ̂) (1− τ (1 + σ̂))
(σ̂ + γ) σ̂
(
vη,t+1 + vθ,t+1 − vθ,t
2
)
and thus
Qt (S) = β exp
(
−γ
(1− τ)(1 + σ̂) (1− τ (1 + σ̂))
(σ̂ + γ) σ̂
(
vη,t+1 + vθ,t+1 − vθ,t
2
))
× exp
(
−γ(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
(
−γ(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
− 1
)
vω,t+1
2
)
.(A5)
Expression (8) in the main text is a special case when τ = 0.
Decentralization (asset purchases): We now derive expressions for insur-
ance contract purchases, Bt(st+1; s
t) and B∗t (ηt+1, θt+1; s
t) and verify that, given
all conjectured prices and quantities, agents’ budget constraints are satisfied.
3If we allowed insurance contracts to be traded across islands contingent on ωt+1 then agents would
pool ωt+1 risk and insurance prices would be Pr ((ωt+1, ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ S)× β 6= Qt (S) .
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Given that any available inter-island insurance contract can be purchased at the
same price on the within-island market, B∗t (ηt+1, θt+1; s
t) = 0 for all (ηt+1, θt+1) is
consistent with individual optimization (Proposition 1, part (iii)). Thus, agents
optimize when purchasing all their insurance on the island on which they are
located. At the same time, becauseQ∗t
(
Z; st
)
= Q∗t (Z) , no agent has an incentive
to try to sell insurance to an agent located on another island. To understand this,
note that the price at which one agent (say agent i1) with history s
t
i1
is willing to
buy, on the margin, a set of claims that pay if and only if (ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z is the
probability of that event times agent i1’s expected marginal rate of substitution,
i.e. Pr ((ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z) × Qt
(
S; sti1
)
. The price at which a second agent on a
different island (agent i2 with history s
t
i2
) is willing to sell this insurance to agent
i1 is the same probability times agent i2’s expected marginal rate of substitution,
Pr ((ηt+1, θt+1) ∈ Z) × Qt
(
S; sti2
)
. If agents i1 and i2 did not share the same
marginal rate of substitution (i.e., if Qt
(
S; sti1
)
6= Qt
(
S; sti2
)
), then there could
be no equilibrium without inter-island trade, because any such equilibrium would
feature unexploited gains from trade. Thus Qt(S, s
t) = Qt(S) is the crucial result
supporting an absence of inter-island trade.
Finally, we now derive an expression for purchases of state-contingent claims,
Bt(st+1; s
t), and verify budget balance. Given B∗t (Z; s
t) = 0 ∀Z,∀st, realized
wealth at st implicitly defines insurance purchases:
Bt−1(st; s
t−1) = δdt(s
t).
We will now guess and verify the following solution for dt(s
t) :
dt(s
t) = dˆt
(
st
)
+ Tt
(
st
)
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where
Tt
(
st
)
= ct
(
st
)
− λ
(
wt
(
st
)
ht
(
st
))1−τ
,
dˆt
(
st
)
= E
s
t
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+j(s
t+j)−γ
ct(st)−γ
Tt+j (st+j)
 .
The logic for this guess is that insurance payouts must deliver the appropriately
discounted present value of lifetime differences between consumption and after-tax
earnings.
We now need to check that the agent’s budget constraint is satisfied. Given
B∗t (Z; s
t) = 0 ∀Z,∀st this amounts to checking that
ct
(
st
)
+
∫ ∫ ∫
Qt (ω, η, θ) Bt
(
(ω, η, θ) ; st
)
dω dη dθ
= λ
(
wt
(
st
)
ht
(
st
))1−τ
+ dˆt
(
st
)
+ Tt
(
st
)
.
Given the conjecture for T
(
st
)
this simplifies to
(A6)
∫ ∫ ∫
Qt (ω, η, θ) Bt
(
(ω, η, θ) ; st
)
dω dη dθ = dˆt
(
st
)
.
To verify that this equation is in fact satisfied, we will write the functionsQt (ω, η, θ) ,
Bt
(
(ω, η, θ) ; st
)
and dˆt
(
st
)
all in terms of the decision rule for consumption
ct
(
st
)
. The ratio of after-tax earnings to consumption is
λ
(
wt
(
st
)
ht
(
st
))1−τ
ct (st)
= exp
(
(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂
εt −
γ + σ̂
σ̂
M˜at
)
,
so
Tt
(
st
)
=
(
1− exp
(
(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂
(κt + θt)−
γ + σ̂
σ̂
M˜at
))
ct
(
st
)
= ct(s
t)
1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ (κt + θt)
)
∫ ∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ (κt + θt)
)
dF aκ,tdFθ,t
 ,
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where the second line uses
M˜at =
σ̂
σ̂ + γ
log
∫ ∫
exp
(
(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂
(κt + θt)
)
dF aκ,tdFθ.t.
Substituting the definition for Tt+j (st+j) into the one for dˆt
(
st
)
, and multiplying
and dividing by ct(s
t), gives
(A7)
dˆt
(
st
)
= ct(s
t)Est
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+j(s
t+j)−γ
ct(st)−γ
ct+j(s
t+j)
ct(st)
×
×
(
1− exp
(
(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂
(
κt +
j∑
i=1
ηt+i + θt+j
)
−
γ + σ̂
σ̂
M˜a+jt+j
))]
= ct(s
t)Est
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+j(s
t+j)1−γ
ct(st)1−γ
×
×
1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂
(
κt +
∑j
i=1 ηt+i + θt+j
))
∫
....
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂
(
κt +
∑j
i=1 ηt+i + θt+j
))
dF aκ,t dFη,t+1 ... dFη,t+j dFθ,t+j

= ct(s
t)
1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
dF aκ,t
Est
[∑∞
j=1 (βδ)
j ct+j(s
t+j)1−γ
ct(st)1−γ
]
,
where the second equation uses
M˜a+jt+j =
σ̂
σ̂ + γ
log
∫
....
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂
(
κt +
j∑
i=1
ηt+i + θt+j
))
dF aκ,t dFη,t+1 ... dFη,t+j dFθ,t+j .
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Thus
Bt−1((ωt, ηt, θt) ; s
t−1)(A8)
= δ
(
dˆt
(
st
)
+ Tt
(
st
))
= δct(s
t)
1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
dF aκ,t
Est
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+j(s
t+j)1−γ
ct(st)1−γ

+δct(s
t)
1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ (κt + θt)
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ (κt + θt)
)
dF aκ,tdFθ,t
 .
Substituting eq. (A7) and eq. (A3) into eq. (A6) gives
βct
(
st
)γ
Est
[
ct+1(s
t, st+1)
−γ Bt
(
st+1; s
t
)]
(A9)
= ct
(
st
)1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
dF aκ,t
Est
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+j(s
t+j)1−γ
ct(st)1−γ
 .
Let LHS(st) denote the left-hand side of eq. (A9), substitute in eq. (A8) and
simplify
LHS(st) = βct
(
st
)γ
Est
[
ct+1(s
t, st+1)
−γ δct+1(s
t+1)×
×

1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt+1
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt+1
)
dF a+1κ,t+1
Est+1
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+1+j(s
t+1+j)1−γ
ct+1(st+1)1−γ
+
+
1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ (κt+1 + θt+1)
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ (κt+1 + θt+1)
)
dF a+1κ,t+1dFθ,t+1


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= βδct
(
st
)γ
Est
[
ct+1(s
t, st+1)
1−γ×
×

1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
dF aκ,t
Est+1
 ∞∑
j=1
(βδ)j ct+1+j(s
t+1+j)1−γ
ct+1(st+1)1−γ
+
+
1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
dF aκ,t


= βδct
(
st
)γ1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
dF aκ,t
 Est
[
Est+1
[
∞∑
k=1
(βδ)k−1 ct+k(s
t+k)1−γ
]]
= ct
(
st
)1− exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
∫
exp
(
(1− τ)1+σ̂σ̂ κt
)
dF aκ,t
 Est
[
∞∑
k=1
(βδ)k
ct+k(s
t+k)1−γ
ct (st)
1−γ
]
,
which is the same as the right-hand side of eq. (A9). We conclude that the
budget constraint is satisfied when state-contingent bond purchases are given by
eq. (A8).
B. Household Models
We begin with the household model of Section II where household composition
is insurable (an abbreviated version is contained in Appendix B). Next, we present
the alternative model, also briefly discussed in Section II, where demographics are
uninsurable.
B1. The household model of Section II
Suppose that utility for individual i in a household of g adult workers (“g” for
“grownups”) and k children (“k” for kids) is given by
u(c, hi, g, k) =
1
1− γ
(
c
e(g, k)
)1−γ
−
exp (ϕ)
1 + σ
h1+σi ,
where c is household consumption and hi is i’s hours worked. The equivalence
scale is given by e and satisfies eg ∈ (0, 1], egg < 0, ek ∈ (0, 1], and e (1, 0) = 1 for
all g ≥ 1 and k ≥ 0. Assume that the household utility function attaches equal
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weights to all adults (and no weight to the children), so total utility is given by
(B1) U =
g∑
i=1
u(c, hi, g) =
g
1− γ
(
c
e(g, k)
)1−γ
−
g∑
i=1
(
exp (ϕ)
1 + σ
h1+σi
)
As in Section A of this Online Appendix, let xt = (a, ϕ, αt) denote the island-
level components of the individual state. Each island-level planner can insure
realizations of εt, g, and k. The planner’s problem is to choose functions ct(xt, g, k),
hit(xt, εt, g, k) for i = 1, ..., g to solve
max{ct,hit}
∫ [
g
1− γ
(
ct(xt, g, k)
e (g, k)
)1−γ
−
g∑
i=1
∫
exp ((γ + σ)ϕ)
1 + σ
hit(xt, εt, g, k)
1+σ dF aεt
]
dFt (g, k)
subject to the after-tax resource constraint∫ [ g∑
i=1
∫
λ [exp (αt + εit) hit (xt, εt, g, k)]
1−τ dF aεt − ct(xt, g, k)
]
dFt (g, k) = 0,
where the objective function and the constraint recognize that there is a non-
degenerate within-island distribution Ft (g, k) of household workers and children.
Moreover, in light of the result of Section A of this Online Appendix, we have
imposed that consumption is independent of εt.
The first-order conditions with respect to ct(xt, g, k) and hit(xt, εt, g, k) are,
respectively,
ge (g, k)γ−1 ct(xt, g, k)
−γ = χt(B2)
exp (ϕ) hit(xt, εt, g, k)
σ+τ = χtλ (1− τ) exp ((1− τ)αt) exp ((1− τ) εt) ,(B3)
where χt is the multiplier on the date t island-level resource constraint.
Let ct(xt, 1, 0) denote household consumption for a one-person household. Then
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equation (B2) implies
ct (xt, g, k) = ct(xt, 1, 0)
(
g
e (g, k)1−γ
) 1
γ
.
Combining the two first-order conditions (B2)-(B3) gives
hit(xt, εt, g, k) =
(
gct(xt, g, k)
−γ
e (g, k)1−γ
λ (1 − τ) exp (−ϕ+ (1− τ)αt + (1− τ)εt)
) 1
σ+τ
.
Substitute in the consumption expression for the one-person households:
hit =
[
ct(xt, 1, 0)
−γ λ (1− τ) exp (−ϕ+ (1− τ)αt + (1− τ)εt)
] 1
σ+τ ,
so individual hours are insensitive to household size.
Finally we can solve for ct(xt, 1, 0) from the island resource constraint:
0 =
∫ { g∑
i=1
∫
λ [exp (αt + εt) hit (xt, εt, g, k)]
1−τ dF aεt − ct(xt, g, k)
}
dFt (g, k)
=
∫ { g∑
i=1
∫ ∫
λ
[
exp (αt + κit + θit) ct(xt, 1, 0)
− γ
σ+τ (λ (1− τ))
1
σ+τ
× exp
(
−
ϕ
σ + τ
+
1− τ
σ + τ
αt +
(
1− τ
σ + τ
)
εt
)]1−τ
dF aεt
−ct(xt, 1, 0)
(
g
e (g, k)1−γ
) 1
γ
}
dFt (g, k) .
Collecting terms:
ct(xt, 1, 0)
1+( 1−τσ+τ )γ
= g¯ exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
αt −
1− τ
σ + τ
ϕ
)
×
∫
exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
εt
)
dF aεt
× (1− τ)
1−τ
σ+τ (λ)
1+σ
σ+τ
(∫ (
g
e (g, k)1−γ
) 1
γ
dFt (g, k)
)−1
,
where g¯ =
∫
g dFt (g, k). Substitute out for σ̂ = (σ + τ) / (1− τ) and simplify the
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expression as:
log ct(xt, 1, 0) = (1− τ)
1 + σ̂
γ + σ̂
αt −
ϕ
γ + σ̂
+ C˜at ,
where the constant C˜at is defined as
exp C˜at = (g¯)
σ̂
γ+σ̂
(∫ (
g
e (g, k)1−γ
) 1
γ
dFt (g, k)
)− σ̂
γ+σ̂
(1− τ)
1
γ+σ̂ (λ)
1+σ̂
γ+σ̂
×
[∫
exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
εt
)
dF aεt
] σ̂
γ+σ̂
.
The implied allocations for household consumption and individual labor supply
are then
log cat (xt, g, k) = D (g, k) − (1− τ) ϕ̂+ (1− τ)
(
1 + σ̂
σˆ + γ
)
αt + C˜
a
t
log hit (xt, εt, g, k) = −ϕ̂+
(1− γ)
(σ̂ + γ)
αt +
1
σ̂
εt + H˜
a
t ,
where ϕ̂ = ϕ/ ((1− τ) (σ̂ + γ)) is the rescaled preference weight,
D (g, k) ≡ log g +
(1− γ)
γ
log
(
g
e (g, k)
)
and
H˜at = −
γ
σ + τ
C˜at +
1
σ + τ
log (λ (1− τ)) .
Note that the individual hours allocation is independent of (g, k) , and the house-
hold consumption allocation is independent of εt.
B2. Alternative household model with uninsurable demographics
Utility of a household with g adults and k children is still given by equation (B1).
The island-level components of the individual state are now xt = (a, ϕ, αt, g, k) .
The planner can insure only against realizations of εt. The planner chooses func-
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tions ct(xt) and hit (xt, εt) for i = 1, ..., g to solve
max
ct(xt),{hit(xt,·)}
{
g
1− γ
(
ct(xt)
e (g, k)
)1−γ
−
g∑
i=1
∫
exp (ϕ)
1 + σ
hit(xt, εt)
1+σ dF aεt
}
subject to the island-level after-tax resource constraint
ct(xt)−
g∑
i=1
∫
λ [exp (αt + εt)hit (xt, εt)]
1−τ dF aεt = 0,
where, in light of the result of Section A of this Online Appendix, we have imposed
that consumption is independent of εt.
The first-order conditions with respect to ct(xt) and hit (xt, εt) are, respectively,
g
e (g, k)1−γ
ct(xt)
−γ = χt
exp (ϕ) hit (xt, εt)
σ+τ = χtλ (1− τ) exp ((1− τ)αt) exp ((1− τ) εt) .
Combining the two conditions and simplifying terms yields the expression for
individual hours
hit (xt, εt)(B4)
=
(
g ct(xt)
−γ
e (g, k)1−γ
) 1
σ+τ
(λ (1− τ))
1
σ+τ exp
(
−
ϕ
σ + τ
+
1− τ
σ + τ
αt +
1− τ
σ + τ
εt
)
= g
1
σˆ(1−τ) e (g, k)
γ−1
σˆ(1−τ) (λ (1− τ))
1
σˆ(1−τ) exp
(
1
σ̂
(
αt + εt −
ϕ
1− τ
))
ct(xt)
−γ
σˆ(1−τ)
and the expression for household consumption
ct(xt) =
g∑
i∈1
∫
λ [exp (αt + εt) hit (xt, εt)]
1−τ dF aεt
= g exp ((1− τ)αt)
∫
λ exp ((1− τ) εt)hit (xt, εt)
1−τ dF aεt
= (g)1+
1−τ
σ+τ e (g, k)(γ−1)
1−τ
σ+τ ct (xt)
− γ(1−τ)
σ+τ exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
αt −
1− τ
σ + τ
ϕ
)
× (1− τ)
1−τ
σ+τ λ
1+σ
σ+τ
∫
exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
εt
)
dF aεt
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Taking logs:(
1 + γ
1− τ
σ + τ
)
log ct (xt)
=
(
1 +
1− τ
σ + τ
)
log g + (γ − 1)
1− τ
σ + τ
log e (g, k) +
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
αt −
1− τ
σ + τ
ϕ
+
1− τ
σ + τ
log (1− τ) + log
1 + σ
σ + τ
λ+ log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
εt
)
dF aεt
and rearranging
log ct (xt) =
σ+τ
1−τ
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
log g +
1
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
log g −
1− γ
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
log e (g, k) +
1 + σ
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
αt
−
ϕ
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
+
1
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
log (1− τ) +
1+σ
1−τ
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
log λ
+
σ+τ
1−τ
σ+τ
1−τ + γ
log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ)
σ + τ
εt
)
dF aεt.
Using the σ̂ = (σ + τ) / (1− τ) notation:
(B5) log ct (xt) =
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
log g−
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
log e (g, k)+
(1− τ) (1 + σ̂)
σ̂ + γ
αt−
ϕ
σ̂ + γ
+C˜at ,
where C˜at is defined as
C˜at ≡
1
σ̂ + γ
[
log (1− τ) + (1 + σ̂) log λ+ σ̂ log
∫
exp
(
(1− τ) (1 + σ̂)
σ̂
εt
)
dF aεt
]
.
Now substitute the expression for ct (xt) of eq. (B5) into eq. (B4) to derive an
expression for hit (xt, εt),
log hit (xt, εt) =
1
1− τ
1
σ̂
log g +
γ − 1
1− τ
1
σ̂
log e (g, k) −
1
σ̂
ϕ
1− τ
+
1
σ̂
αt
+
1
σ̂
εt +
1
σ̂
1
1− τ
log (λ (1− τ))−
1
σ̂
γ
1− τ
log ct (xt)
=
1
1− τ
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
(log g − log e (g, k)) +
1
σ̂
εt +
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
αt −
1
σ̂ + γ
ϕ
1− τ
+ H˜at ,
where
H˜at ≡ −
1
σ̂
1
1− τ
log (λ (1− τ))−
1
σ̂
γ
1− τ
C˜at .
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We conclude that household consumption and individual hours are given by
log ct(xt) = D
c (g, k) − (1− τ) ϕ̂+ (1− τ)
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
αt + C˜
a
t
log hit (xt, εt) = D
h (g, k) − ϕ̂+
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
αt +
εt
σ̂
+ H˜at , i = 1, ..., g
where ϕ̂ = ϕ/ ((1− τ) (σ̂ + γ)) is the rescaled preference weight, and the equiv-
alization dummies Dc (g, k) and Dh (g, k) are given by
Dc (g, k) =
1 + σ̂
σ̂ + γ
log g −
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
log e (g, k)
Dh (g, k) =
1
1− τ
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
[log g − log e (g, k)] .
To sum up, in this case both household consumption and individual hours depend
in general on the vector of household type (g, k) . In the special case γ = 1 hours
are again independent of (g, k) and consumption is proportional to the number
of adults g.
C. Identification
This appendix contains proofs of Propositions 3 and a new Corollary 3.1 that
extends Proposition 3 to allow for biannual panel data. Finally, this appendix
also contains the additional identification assumptions made in the estimation of
the model (see Section III.C).
C1. Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 [identification with no consumption data] With an un-
balanced panel on wages and hours from t = 1, ..., T , and an external estimate of
measurement error in earnings vµy, the same parameters as in Proposition 2 are
identified.
Proof The proof is organized in three sequential steps:
1) Given foreknowledge of vµy, we identify σ̂, vµh, and the sequence {vθ,t}
T−1
t=1
off moments involving (co-)variance of changes minus changes in (co-)variances:
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a) The Frisch elasticity 1/σ̂ is identified by 1/σ̂ equal to
covat (∆ log wˆ,∆ log hˆ) + var
a
t (∆ log hˆ)−∆cov
a
t (log wˆ, log hˆ)−∆var
a
t (log hˆ)
covat
(
∆ log wˆ,∆ log hˆ
)
+ varat (∆ log wˆ)−∆cov
a
t
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
−∆varat (log wˆ)− 2vµy
.
This expression can equivalently be formulated as
1
σ̂
=
covat (∆ log yˆ,∆ log hˆ)−∆cov
a
t (log yˆ, log hˆ)
covat (∆ log yˆ,∆ log wˆ)−∆cov
a
t (log yˆ, log wˆ)− 2vµy
.
b) The sequence {vθ,t}
T−1
t=1 is then identified by panel data available from
t = 2, ..., T :
covat (∆ log wˆ,∆ log hˆ) + var
a
t (∆ log hˆ)−∆cov
a
t (log wˆ, log hˆ)−∆var
a
t (log hˆ)
= 2
(1 + σ̂)
σ̂2
vθ,t−1.
c) Measurement error in hours is then identified from e.g.
varat
(
∆ log hˆ
)
−∆varat
(
log hˆ
)
=
2
σ̂2
vθ,t−1 + 2vµh.
2) The parameter γ and the two sets of parameters {vηt}
T
t=2 and {vωt}
T
t=2 are
then identified from within-cohort changes in the macro moments, ∆varat (log wˆ) ,
∆varat
(
log hˆ
)
, and ∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
, all available from t = 2, ..., T .
These parameters can be identified recursively as follows:
3) Combine (17)-(18) to get(
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
− 1σ̂ (vηt +∆vθt)
)2(
∆varat
(
log hˆ
)
− 1
σ̂2
(vηt +∆vθt)
) =
(
1−γ
σ̂+γ
)2
(vωt)
2(
1−γ
σ̂+γ
)2
vωt
= vωt
Combine this with (16) to get an equation in (vηt +∆vθt),(
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
− 1σ̂ (vηt +∆vθt)
)2(
∆varat
(
log hˆ
)
− 1σ̂2 (vηt +∆vθt)
) = ∆varat (log wˆ)− (vηt +∆vθt) .
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Therefore, each element of the sequence {vηt +∆vθt}
T
t=2 is identified by
4
(vηt +∆vθt) =
(
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
))2
−∆varat (log wˆ) ·∆var
a
t
(
log hˆ
)
∆covat (log wˆ,log hˆ)
σ̂ −
∆varat (log wˆ)
σ̂2 −∆var
a
t
(
log hˆ
) ,
which, given {vθ,t}
T−1
t=1 , pins down {vη,t}
T−1
t=2 .
a) Given vηt + ∆vθt, each element of the sequence {vωt}
T
t=2 is identified
by (16),
vωt = ∆var
a
t (log wˆ)− (vηt +∆vθt) .
b) Given vηt +∆vθt and vωt, the risk aversion parameter γ is determined
by (18) as the solution to the following equation:
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
=
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
vωt
−
1
σ̂
(vηt +∆vθt)
vωt
.
4) Given values for γ, σ̂, {vθt}
T−1
t=1 and {vµh, vµy}, the following macro mo-
ments, available for all t = 1, ..., T and evaluated for the youngest age
group, identify the sequence of cohort effects
{
vϕ̂t, vα0t
}T
t=1
, {vκ0t}
T
t=2, and
(vκ0T + vθT ). We do it in two steps
a) First, the following two linearly independent macro moments, available
for all t = 1, ..., T and evaluated for the youngest age group, identify the
sequence of cohort effects in insurable- and uninsurable initial wages,
4To see this, note that(
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
−
1
σ̂
(vηt +∆vθt)
)2
= (∆varat (log wˆ)− (vηt +∆vθt))
(
∆varat
(
log hˆ
)
−
1
σ̂2
(vηt +∆vθt)
)
(
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
))2
−
∆covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
σ̂
(vηt +∆vθt) +
1
σ̂2
(vηt +∆vθt)
2
= ∆varat (log wˆ) ·∆var
a
t
(
log hˆ
)
−
∆varat (log wˆ)
σ̂2
(vηt +∆vθt)
− (vηt +∆vθt) ·∆var
a
t
(
log hˆ
)
+
1
σ̂2
(vηt +∆vθt)
2
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{vα0t}
T
t=1, {vκ0t}
T
t=2, and (vκ0T + vθT ),
var0t (log wˆ) = vα0t + (vκ0t + vθt) + vµy + vµh
cov0t
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
=
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)
· vα0t +
1
σ̂
(vκ0t + vθt)− vµh.
b) Finally, the following macro moments, available for all t = 1, ..., T and
evaluated for the youngest age group, identify the sequence of cohort
effects in preference heterogeneity,
{
vϕ̂t
}T
t=1
,
cov0t
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
+var0t
(
log hˆ
)
= vϕ̂t+
(1− γ) (1 + σ̂)
(σ̂ + γ)2
vα0t+
1 + σ̂
σ̂2
(vκ0t + vθt) ,
since every other parameter in those three moments is already known.
This concludes the proof.
C2. Extending Proposition 3 to biannual data
It is possible to extend Proposition 3 to allow for biannual panel data towards
the end of the sample, so the proposition can be applied directly to the PSID. This
amounts to combining Proposition 3 with Corollary 2.2. We state this formally
as the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1 [extending Proposition 3 to biannual panel data] Sup-
pose one has access to an unbalanced panel on wages and hours, but no data on
consumption. The panel data are available annually until year tˆ and biannually
thereafter, i.e. available for the years t = 1, 2, ..., tˆ and t = tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T −2, T .
Suppose further that one has an exogenous estimate of measurement error in
earnings, vµy. Then, one can identify {σ̂, γ, vµh, vµc} , the sequences
{
vϕ̂t
}T
t=1
,
{vωt, vηt}
tˆ
t=2 , {vθt, vκ0t, vα0t}
tˆ
t=1, and {vθt, vκ0t, vα0t, vω,t−1 + vωt, vη,t−1 + vηt} for
t = tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T−2, as well as the sums {vη,T−1 + vη,T + vθ,T} and
{
vκ0,T + vθ,T
}
.
Proof Start by following the proof of Proposition 3 for the years t = 1, 2, ..., tˆ.
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Consider then the time-varying parameters for the biannual sample, i.e., for t =
tˆ, tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T − 2, T . These parameters are identified in five sequential steps.
1) Identify {vθ,t} for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ + 2, tˆ + 4, ..., T − 2, as well as
vηtˆ and vκ0tˆ, by combining the following moments,
varat
(
∆2 log wˆ
)
−∆2varat (log wˆ) = 2vθ,t−2 + 2 (vµy + vµh) .
which is available for t = tˆ, tˆ + 2, tˆ+ 4, ..., T − 2, T . Note that, since vθ,tˆ is
identified, so are vη,tˆ and vκ0 tˆ.
2) Identify {vηt + vη,t−1} for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T − 2, and
the sum (vη,T + vη,T−1 + vθT ). Start by combining the biannual versions of
(17), (18), and (16) to get an equation where
(
vηt + vη,t−1 +∆
2vθt
)
is the
only unknown:(
∆2covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
− 1σ̂
(
vηt + vη,t−1 +∆
2vθt
))2
∆2varat
(
log hˆ
)
− 1σ̂2 (vηt + vη,t−1 +∆
2vθt)
=
((
1−γ
σ̂+γ
)
(vωt + vω,t−1)
)2
(
1−γ
σ̂+γ
)2
(vωt + vω,t−1)
= (vωt + vω,t−1)
= ∆2varat (log wˆ)−
(
vηt + vη,t−1 +∆
2vθt
)
.
This gives a linear equation in
(
vηt + vη,t−1 +∆
2vθt
)
,
(vηt + vη,t−1 + vθt − vθ,t−2)
=
(
∆2covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
))2
−∆2varat (log wˆ) ·∆
2varat
(
log hˆ
)
1
σ̂ ·∆
2covat
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
− 1
σ̂2
·∆2varat (log wˆ)−∆
2varat
(
log hˆ
) .
Since {vθt} is known for the years t = tˆ, tˆ+ 2, tˆ+ 4, ..., T − 2, this equation
identifies {vη,t + vη,t−1} for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T − 2, as
well as the sum (vη,T + vη,T−1 + vθ,T ).
3) Given {vη,t + vη,t−1} for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ+ 2, tˆ+ 4, ..., T − 2 and
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(vη,T + vη,T−1 + vθ,T ), the sequence of variances of uninsurable shocks {vω,t + vω,t−1}
for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ+2, tˆ+4, ..., T −2 is identified from the growth
in wage inequality:
∆2varat (log wˆ) = (vωt + vω,t−1) + (vηt + vη,t−1 + vθt)− vθ,t−2.
4) Consider now the cohort effects {vα0t, vκ0t} for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ+
2, ..., T . The uninsurable component vα0t is identified as(
cov0t
(
log wˆ, log hˆ
)
+ vµh
)
−
1
σ̂
(
var0t (log wˆ)− (vµy + vµh)
)
=
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
vα0t +
1
σ̂
(vκ0t + vθt)−
1
σ̂
(vα0t + (vκ0t + vθt))
=
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
−
1
σ̂
)
vα0t,
which is available for t = tˆ, tˆ+2, ..., T . The wage inequality for new cohorts
then identify the variance of the insurable cohort effect
{
vκ0,t
}
:
var0t (log wˆ) = vα0t + (vκ0t + vθt) + vµy + vµh,
which is available for t = tˆ, tˆ + 2, ..., T − 2 since the other components on
the right-hand side are known those years. For the final year t = T we can
only identify the sum
(
vκ0,T + vθT
)
.
5) Finally, the cohort effects
{
vϕ̂,t
}T
t=tˆ
are identified by
var0t
(
log hˆ
)
= vϕ̂t +
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)2
vα0t +
1
σ̂2
(vκ0t + vθt) + vµh
for the biannual years t = tˆ, tˆ+ 2, ..., T , and by
var1t
(
log hˆ
)
= vϕ̂,t−1+
(
1− γ
σ̂ + γ
)2 (
vα0,t−1 + vωt
)
+
1
σ̂2
(
vκ0,t−1 + vηt + vθt
)
+vµh,
available at t = tˆ, tˆ+ 2, ..., T − 2, T , to identify
{
vϕ̂,t
}T
t=tˆ
in the in-between
years.
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D. Test of model specification
Recall the notation of Section III.C of the paper. Λ is an N × 1 vector of
parameters of the model, m(Λ) is a J ×1 vector of theoretical moments and mˆ is
a J × 1 vector of empirical moments from the data. The null hypothesis we want
to test is that the model is “correctly” specified. For this purpose, we construct
the Sargan test-statistic
TSargan = (mˆ−m(Λˆ))
′Vˆ−1(mˆ−m(Λˆ))
which, under the null hypothesis, is distributed as a χ2J−N .
Vˆ is a consistent estimate of the fourth moments matrix. To make things
concrete, we give an example of an element of Vˆ. The second moments used in
estimation are of form cov(xia,t, y
i
a,t). Consider two such moments from the PSID,
for example cov(wi22,1990, h
i
22,1990) and var(∆w
i
26,1994). The corresponding entry
in Vˆ is computed as follows, where K is number of individuals with nonmissing
observations in the age/year cells needed to compute this entry:
1
K
K∑
i=1
[
wi22,1990h
i
22,1990 − cov(w
i
22,1990, h
i
22,1990)
]
×
[(
∆wi26,1994
)2
− var(∆wi26,1994)
]
.
In the baseline model, N = 164 and J = 11, 532. The test statistic implies a
p−value of 0.9991.
In the context of GMM estimation with dynamic panel data, it is known that
overidentifying restrictions (OID) tests can have low power when the number of
moment conditions is large relative to the number of observations used to cal-
culate the empirical moments. Bowsher (2002) offers compelling evidence based
on Monte Carlo experiments. The issue associated with the use of too many
moments is attributed to the need to estimate J(J + 1)/2 separate entries of the
fourth moment matrix when J moment conditions are used. Intuitively, if this
dimensionality is large relative to the sample size, the estimates of the V matrix
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may be poor. In the baseline case, J −N is equal to 11, 368 and is therefore an
order of magnitude larger than the average number of observations per moment.
One may worry that the power of the TSargan statistic is artificially low and the
test result not too informative.
Bowsher (2002) and Roodman (2009) propose a method to restore power to
the Sargan test. This method consists of testing the validity of a reduced number
of moment conditions; the full set of moments is still used in estimation but
a subset of moments is used in the construction of the test-statistic. For our
purposes, one way of collapsing the number of moment conditions used in the
test is to consider covariances by age and by year. For example, instead of using
the A×T covariances {cov(wia,t, h
i
a,t)}a=1,...,A;t=1,...,T , we restrict ourselves to just
A+ T covariances: {cov(wia, h
i
a)}a=1,...,A and {cov(w
i
t, h
i
t)}t=1,...,T . And similarly,
we do so for all other moments. Doing so reduces the number of degrees of freedom
from 11, 368 to 580 and increases the mean number of observations per moment
from 285 to 8, 291 for PSID and from 179 to 5, 318. Therefore, the source of low
power of the OID test should be much weaker under this “collapsed moments”
version of the test. The test continues to yield a p-value above 0.99, failing to
reject the null.
E. Model Estimation: Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure E1. Estimation without CEX data. Data and model fit for moments in levels along
the age dimension. Dotted lines denote 90–10 bootstrapped confidence intervals for the
empirical moments.
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Figure E2. Estimation without CEX data. Data and model fit for moments in levels along
the time dimension. Dotted lines denote 90–10 bootstrapped confidence intervals for the
empirical moments.
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Figure E3. Comparison between (i) the baseline estimates for the variances of the insurable
(vηt) and uninsurable (vωt) innovations modeled as time-polynomials and (ii) estimates for the
same variances modeled as unrestricted sequences.
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Table E1—Parameter Estimates: Baseline Model
vα0t vκ0t vϕ̂t vωt vηt vθt
1967 0.136 0.029 0.045 0.0008 0.0014 0.027
(0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.005)
1968 0.001 0.000 0.089 0.0008 0.0029 0.010
(0.019) (0.003) (0.025) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.003)
1969 0.037 0.001 0.054 0.0009 0.0042 0.011
(0.026) (0.008) (0.013) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.003)
1970 0.140 0.000 0.049 0.0011 0.0053 0.018
(0.037) (0.003) (0.015) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.003)
1971 0.156 0.000 0.049 0.0013 0.0063 0.013
(0.047) (0.010) (0.014) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.003)
1972 0.133 0.003 0.051 0.0017 0.0070 0.017
(0.034) (0.015) (0.013) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.003)
1973 0.001 0.001 0.055 0.0020 0.0076 0.021
(0.010) (0.008) (0.019) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.003)
1974 0.047 0.138 0.059 0.0024 0.0081 0.025
(0.034) (0.047) (0.013) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.004)
1975 0.150 0.014 0.058 0.0028 0.0084 0.022
(0.034) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.004)
1976 0.152 0.052 0.036 0.0032 0.0086 0.029
(0.032) (0.031) (0.013) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.004)
1977 0.089 0.000 0.039 0.0037 0.0087 0.023
(0.030) (0.012) (0.011) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.004)
1978 0.008 0.044 0.055 0.0041 0.0086 0.018
(0.014) (0.025) (0.019) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.003)
1979 0.038 0.080 0.070 0.0045 0.0085 0.025
(0.030) (0.029) (0.016) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.004)
1980 0.068 0.016 0.052 0.0049 0.0083 0.019
(0.030) (0.014) (0.013) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.004)
1981 0.143 0.030 0.046 0.0053 0.0080 0.021
(0.029) (0.020) (0.014) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.003)
1982 0.152 0.040 0.042 0.0056 0.0076 0.023
(0.029) (0.024) (0.011) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.004)
1983 0.115 0.054 0.047 0.0059 0.0072 0.031
(0.019) (0.031) (0.018) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.005)
1984 0.037 0.102 0.051 0.0062 0.0067 0.035
(0.029) (0.036) (0.012) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.005)
1985 0.068 0.070 0.058 0.0065 0.0062 0.036
(0.030) (0.030) (0.013) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.004)
1986 0.136 0.097 0.050 0.0067 0.0057 0.034
(0.028) (0.032) (0.014) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.005)
1987 0.149 0.078 0.051 0.0069 0.0051 0.034
(0.020) (0.028) (0.013) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.004)
1988 0.105 0.044 0.056 0.0071 0.0046 0.036
(0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.005)
1989 0.053 0.098 0.062 0.0072 0.0040 0.033
(0.029) (0.035) (0.013) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.004)
VOL. 104 NO. X CONSUMPTION & LABOR SUPPLY WITH PARTIAL INSURANCE 29
Table E1—(Continued) Parameter Estimates: Baseline Model
vα0t vκ0t vϕ̂t vωt vηt vθt
1990 0.057 0.078 0.039 0.0073 0.0034 0.036
(0.028) (0.030) (0.011) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.005)
1991 0.138 0.077 0.055 0.0074 0.0029 0.042
(0.028) (0.033) (0.013) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.005)
1992 0.152 0.000 0.048 0.0074 0.0024 0.075
(0.032) (0.030) (0.013) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.007)
1993 0.058 0.071 0.038 0.0074 0.0019 0.072
(0.022) (0.029) (0.017) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.006)
1994 0.071 0.027 0.040 0.0075 0.0015 0.061
(0.031) (0.022) (0.012) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.007)
1995 0.182 0.059 0.057 0.0075 0.0012 0.051
(0.033) (0.029) (0.017) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.006)
1996 0.160 0.063 0.051 0.0075 0.0009 0.052
(0.031) (0.032) (0.016) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.006)
1997 0.180 0.154 0.062 0.0075 0.0007 0.055
(0.035) (0.019) (0.016) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.004)
1998 0.024 0.044 0.060 0.0075 0.0005 0.059
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.007)
1999 0.134 0.036 0.057 0.0076 0.0005 0.066
(0.037) (0.016) (0.015) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.005)
2000 0.154 0.029 0.063 0.0077 0.0006 0.074
(0.032) (0.023) (0.018) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.008)
2001 0.129 0.031 0.067 0.0079 0.0007 0.091
(0.033) (0.018) (0.018) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.008)
2002 0.188 0.033 0.068 0.0081 0.0011 0.107
(0.035) (0.022) (0.017) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.011)
2003 0.047 0.057 0.061 0.0084 0.0015 0.101
(0.029) (0.018) (0.022) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.008)
2004 0.098 0.060 0.053 0.0087 0.0021 0.094
(0.039) (0.028) (0.024) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.009)
2005 0.030 0.084 0.085 0.0092 0.0028 0.066
(0.040) (0.027) (0.027) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.008)
2006 0.123 0.109 0.048 0.0098 0.0037 0.037
(0.039) (0.028) (0.014) (0.0023) (0.0045) (0.013)
Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 replications in parentheses.
